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Chapter 1: The Traditional View and Its Alternatives 
Introduction 
The late David Lewis’s 1996 paper “Elusive Knowledge” begins with the 
ostensibly innocent claim, “We know a lot.” This seems right if we consider a wide 
selection of common, everyday beliefs. If that is true, then it also seems right that 
we must be fallibilists about knowledge. On that view, a subject can know that p 
even if their justification for p is not sufficient to rule out every alternative 
possibility in which p is false. Yet, as soon as we start considering alternative 
possibilities, the appeal of fallibilism begins to wane—and along with it the idea 
we know a lot—for two reasons. First, most of our beliefs lack sufficient 
justification to rule out these possibilities and, second, it is difficult to say which 
possibilities must be ruled out and which can be properly ignored.  
Attempts to resolve this ‘problem of the alternatives’ have multiplied in 
recent years with increased focus on the colloquial use of ‘know’. Some argue that 
colloquial use reveals a direction relation between our knowledge claims and non-
traditional factors. For instance, they argue that, in some cases, the difference 
between a person who knows and a person who doesn’t know is only explainable 
by a difference in risk. 
To elicit intuitions in support of this view, two cases are compared. The first 
case includes a subject who is in a low-risk context and for this case it seems right 
to conclude he does know. This is compared with a second case which is like the 




risk and an alternative possibility is introduced. In this high-risk case it seems right 
to conclude the subject does not know.  
Providing an acceptable interpretation of our responses to these cases has 
become a central requirement for any theory dealing with knowledge attributions. 
Most importantly, the theory must be able to explain our intuitions. This is 
especially important for the traditional view because it implies at least one of our 
intuitive responses to the original cases is wrong. On the traditional view, there is 
a standard amount of justification required to know that a proposition is true; in 
other words, the truth-conditions for ‘know’ do not vary. Since the same truth-
conditions apply, one of the responses to the types of cases mentioned above must 
be false. 
Some argue that accommodating our intuitions will require shedding the 
traditional invariantist position. On the contextualist view, the truth-conditions for 
‘know’ vary according to context-dependent features (e.g. risk). This implies the 
invariantist feature of the traditional view is false. To others, the better explanation 
is that practical reasons factor directly into our epistemic justification. These 
practicalists argue that beliefs are not justified solely according to truth-conducive 
reasons but also the practical reasons relevant to a given situation.1  Their view 
conflicts with a second feature of the traditional view that we will refer to as 
                                                             
1 The name ‘practicalist’ or ‘practicalism’ comes from an unpublished paper by Matthias Steup. It is also 




intellectualism—the idea that only truth-conducive or epistemic reasons are relevant 
to the justification of belief.  
This dissertation defends a traditional view of the truth-conditions for 
‘know’.  For the traditionalist, there is both an invariantist and an intellectualist 
component. In chapter 1, I begin by reviewing the contextualist and practicalist 
theories and the implications they have for invariantism and intellectualism. We’ll 
discuss the motivations for contextualism and practicalism as well as the central 
arguments offered in support of these views. Moving to the later chapters, I defend 
invariantism in chapters 2 and 3 and in chapter 4 turn my efforts to a defense of 
intellectualism. 
In chapter 2, I argue that the contextualist view, most prominently 
defended by Keith DeRose and Stewart Cohen, fails in an important respect—it 
does not offer a plausible explanation of our intuitions as they have claimed. While 
contextualism purports to explain ordinary cases akin to those mentioned above, 
it fails to do so with a wider range of intuitions. In particular, contextualism is 
incompatible with the intuition that there is a contradiction between the 
knowledge attribution and denial. Since contextualism implies there is no 
contradiction, they must explain we why think there is in a way that is consistent 
with ordinary usage.  
One the other hand, the traditional view implies that there is a contradiction 
between the two claims. So, as mentioned above, one of the knowledge claims is 




original cases; that is, they must explain what independent reasons there are to 
conclude one of our intuitions from the original case is false. Although it is not 
important to my view which of these claims is false, I will argue that the knowledge 
denial is false because it rests on a mistaken belief. Furthermore, we’ll find that 
understanding the contextualist cases according to the invariantist view is 
consistent with a broader range of intuitions. 
Turning to chapters 3 and 4, the primary focus is on the idea that variations 
in practical issues can alter the justificatory requirements for knowledge. For 
chapter 3, I focus on the contextualist view that practical issues can affect the truth-
conditions for knowledge claims. Borrowing a set of cases from Jonathan Schaffer, 
I argue that our intuitions about knowledge are not driven by practical issues, but 
instead by epistemic concerns. However, this is not a mere issue of whether the 
alternative possibility is salient to the subject.  Only when that alternative is 
probable does it prompt an intuitive denial of knowledge. (And in that case, 
salience is irrelevant.) If this is correct, practical reasons don’t affect our intuitions 
in the way that contextualists have assumed. Only when we have—or believe we 
have—good epistemic reason to think the person’s belief might be false does it 
become intuitive to deny that they know.  
Finally, in chapter 4 I argue against the practicalist view of Jeremy Fantl and 
Matthew McGrath. Beginning with their paper “Evidence, Pragmatics and 




relevant to one’s epistemic justification.2 To put it roughly, whether S knows that 
p is due to a combination of both his epistemic and practical reasons—an idea 
expressed in Fantl and McGrath’s KJ principle. Several counterexamples to this 
principle have been offered and I begin by defending an example from Baron 
Reed. I argue that Reed’s example does apply to KJ and, more importantly, to the 
principles that Fantl and McGrath use to support it. The chapter concludes by 
addressing an important assumption underlying their view: that knowing p is 
sufficient to rationally justify acting on p. If this assumption is correct, then 
practicalism quickly follows. Against this, I argue that knowledge alone isn’t 
enough to rationally justify acting on p—the act must also be worth it.  
So, you might say that this dissertation is an attempt to support the claim 
that we do know a lot. However, it is not an attempt to defend fallibilism directly—
that will be assumed—but indirectly by defending a traditional view in which our 
(fallible) knowledge adheres to invariantist and intellectualist standards. In the 
end, we’ll find a way to interpret and understand ordinary uses of ‘know’ that 
agrees with commonsense and does better on the whole than the non-traditional 
theories offered thus far. 
§1.1 Skepticism and Ordinary Knowledge. 
In line with Lewis’s sentiment above, we ordinarily take ourselves to know 
a fair number of things and we take it that we speak truly when making various 
                                                             




knowledge claims from “Detroit is in Michigan” to “I have hands.” But there is 
also the ordinary thought that knowledge requires ruling out alternative 
possibilities—or, at least plausible alternatives—in which your belief is false. It 
seems that our evidence or reasons for belief should be good enough to rule out 
these possibilities.  
For instance, if I always leave my keys in my coat pocket, then it seems 
reasonable enough to say that I know they are there even though I’m in the other 
room and my coat is in the closet. However, if I put them on the top of the fridge 
an equal amount and often forget where I put them, then it doesn’t seem that I 
know they are in my coat pocket. In the second case, there is an alternative outcome 
in which my keys are on the fridge rather than in my coat that my evidence can’t 
rule out. Rationally speaking, this is enough to question my belief they are in my 
coat and so, it would seem, enough to deny I know where they are even if they are 
still in my coat. 
Examples like this indicate one way in which alternative outcomes factor 
into our ordinary knowledge assessments. The skeptical arguments we find in 
philosophical discussion play off from this intuitive notion of knowledge and 
what is required to know; specifically, it focuses on the idea of ruling out 
alternatives. Yet, there is an important difference between the way in which 
alternatives impact ordinary knowledge in the example above and the sense in 
which it impacts knowledge for the skeptical philosopher. In the keys example, 




fridge.” But what if my kid said, “I saw an alien eat your car keys!” No sane person 
would take this seriously, of course. Yet, it is possible that a key-eating alien snuck 
in and ate my keys. For the skeptic, this unlikely possibility is enough to destroy 
knowledge. It is simply another alternative we can’t rule out because my 
evidence—I remember putting them in my coat pocket—isn’t enough to 
distinguish between the case in which they are in my coat and I put them there, 
and the case in which I put them in the coat pocket and aliens soon after came and 
stole them. Saving ordinary knowledge will require, at the very least, showing that 
the keys-on-fridge case is relevantly different than the implausible key-eating-
alien scenario. We need to explain why the key-eating alien doesn’t affect whether 
I know while the possibility I left my keys on the fridge does. Maybe not 
impossible, but certainly a difficult task. 
Once we recognize how alternative outcomes can overturn claims to 
knowledge, it starts to look like we don’t know a lot of the ordinary things that we 
think we do. And yet, as Lewis points out, the intuition usually remains that we 
do know a lot. As it stands, we end up with two competing intuitions about what 
we know. On the one hand, it sure seems that we know a lot. But, on the other 
hand, it seems like there are a lot of alternatives we can’t rule out, implying that 
we don’t know much at all. So, what is it? In its two-thousand-year history, no 
response to philosophical skepticism has gained a foothold and this has led some 
to think it is an unresolvable issue. Yet, skepticism has not received broad 




with this pseudo-paradoxical deadlock, it is at this point that the contextualist 
steps in. 
§1.2 Skepticism and The Contextualist Solution. 
To take a closer look at these competing intuitions and how they factor into 
the contextualist view, let’s take a brief look at the situation in argument form. The 
standard skeptical argument begins with an ordinary proposition like “I know I 
have hands.” Focusing on the fact such claims are justified by perceptual 
experience, the argument then presents an alternative possibility in which I have 
all the same perceptual experiences, but I don’t have hands. For instance, I might 
be completely ignorant that I am in the Matrix and so go on believing that I have 
hands among many other things, when I’m just a handless body floating in a vat 
of goo.  
Intuitively, we cannot rule out the Matrix possibility, at least, with any 
certainty. Because of this it seems that I don’t know I have hands. And still, it seems 
as if this quite ordinary matter of having hands is something that I do know. So, 
we have two propositions that are inconsistent with each other, but both seem 
correct: 
(OK) I know that I have hands. 
(SK) I don’t know that I’m not a handless brain-in-a-vat. 
The problem, of course, is that (OK) implies (SK) is false and (SK) implies that (OK) 
is false. For some, (SK) is the stronger claim despite the fact (OK) seems correct. 




we cannot disprove (SK), it then follows that I don’t know that I have hands. And 
by further implication, we don’t have much knowledge, in general. 
1) If (OK) I know that I have hands, then (not-SK) I know that I’m not a 
handless brain-in-a-vat. 
 
2) (SK) I don’t know that I’m not a handless brain-in-a-vat. 
 
Therefore, OK is false. 
 
As mentioned earlier, responses to skepticism have utilized several different 
strategies, but whether these responses attack (OK) or (SK), none has captured 
broad appeal. Still, it isn’t as if skeptical arguments have overrun the intuition we 
know a lot of ordinary things. 
In response to this tension, as well as the lack of any direct solution to the 
problem, contextualists attempt to provide a way around the skeptical conclusion 
and validate the belief that we know a lot of ordinary things. Interestingly, they 
do this while avoiding a wholesale rejection of skepticism. To put it roughly, they 
argue that there are contexts in which SK turns out to be true and contexts in which 
OK turns out to be true. So, in effect, contextualism validates the intuitiveness of 
both OK and SK. 
At first glance, this strategy might seem to land them in a relativist position 
because OK and SK are inconsistent with one another. However, the contextualist 
avoids this result by looking at how we use indexical terms such as ‘tall’ or ‘large’. 
When using a term like ‘tall’, the truth-conditions of that term will be determined 




this that the truth-conditions can vary from context to context. Since the truth-
conditions vary, the meaning of ‘tall’ varies and so the proposition expressed also 
varies. Thus, two sentences such as “Steve is tall” and “Steve is not tall” might not 
be contradictory if uttered in distinct contexts. For example, in the context of an 
NBA basketball team, Steve, who is six-feet-tall, would not be considered tall and 
so “Steve is not tall” would be true. However, in an ordinary context he would be 
considered tall and so “Steve is tall” would be true. The explanation for this 
difference is that the standards for being tall are lower in the ordinary contexts than 
in the context of NBA players. Because the shift in standards results in a difference 
in the proposition being expressed, there is no contradiction between the two 
claims. 
Just as we use and understand indexical terms like ‘tall’, the contextualist 
argues we should see ‘know’ in the same way. If correct, then what is expressed 
by the sentence “S knows that p” will vary based on the context similar to the 
varying expressions of ‘tall’ just described.3  When we apply this reasoning to the 
tension between ordinary and skeptical intuitions about knowledge, we’ll find 
that the truth-conditions for ‘know’ are weaker in ordinary contexts and higher in 
skeptical contexts. And just like the example using ‘tall’ above, the sentence in 
                                                             
3 Although contextualists make reference to terms like ‘tall’ in explaining their theory, explanation is the 
only purpose. The intent is not to make an argument by analogy and for good reason given important 






question does not express the same proposition in the ordinary and skeptical 
contexts. Thus, there is no contradiction.  
Varied truth-conditions also occur between different ordinary contexts. In 
a context with little at stake the truth-conditions are, again, weaker than a context 
with a lot at stake—we’ll look at some examples shortly. The result of this is that 
knowledge can be attributed or denied on the basis of, for example, a change in 
the pragmatic issues of a speaker’s context. If correct, this result would deal a swift 
blow to the traditional view that only epistemic factors—belief, evidence, reasons, 
etc.—are relevant to knowledge assessments. 
Before moving on, let me add two points. First, contextualists do not see 
their theory as something which applies beyond the semantic level. So, even 
though the truth-conditions for ‘know’ might vary, it does not follow that the 
standard for knowledge varies. In other words, ordinary use of know may or may 
not accurately represent a correct understanding of the concept underlying these 
uses. This distinction has brought about a few important criticisms. For instance, 
it is often alleged that the contextualist treatment of skepticism is superficial 
because it doesn’t address the actual problem. While that is an interesting issue, it 
will not be addressed in this dissertation.  
Second, contextualists do not take discussion of indexical terms like ‘tall’ as 
an analogical argument for their view that ‘know’ is an indexical term (See fn. 3). 
They do not, for instance, argue that ‘tall’ is an indexical term and since ‘know’ 




term. Rather, the main evidence for their view comes from looking at ordinary 
cases in which knowledge attributions change and appear to do so without an 
epistemically relevant explanation.  Contextualists argue that their view provides 
the best explanation of these ordinary knowledge attributing and denying 
practices. So, we now turn to these cases. 
§1.3 First Person Cases 
In the last section, we discussed the long-standing tension between the 
intuition we have ordinary knowledge and the skeptical conclusion that we don’t 
know much at all. This is the main problem contextualists hope to solve. However, 
instead of correcting the problem by showing that one or the other is wrong, 
contextualists propose an explanation that validates both. The most prominent 
support of this view comes from the work of Keith DeRose.4  In this section we’ll 
look at DeRose’s contribution to the discussion which comes from his comparison 
of various ordinary uses of ‘know’. 
To support the contextualist position, DeRose developed sets of cases that 
reflect ordinary uses of ‘know’, but seem to draw out contradictory intuitions 
similar to the tension between OK and SK. The basic features of one set of cases—
his now famous ‘Bank Cases’—are as follows: in one version of the case, the 
subject(s) has almost nothing at stake and it seems right to say he/she knows. But 
                                                             





when we compare this ‘low-stakes’ case to a case in which there is a lot at stake, it 
then seems incorrect to attribute knowledge to the subject.  
One important aspect of this case is that the subject is both attributing and 
denying knowledge. So, the subject is both attributor and subject—this is an 
important distinction that will come into play later. Because the subject is making 
both the assertions, we’ll refer to these cases as first-person. Here is the original 
version of the bank case in which the subject has virtually no practical risk: 
Bank-Low: Keith and his wife are driving home on a Friday afternoon. 
They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. 
As they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, 
as they often are on Friday afternoons. They generally like to deposit their 
paychecks as soon as possible, but it is not especially important in this case 
that they be deposited right away, so Keith suggests they drive straight 
home and deposit their paychecks on Saturday morning. His wife says, 
“Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on 
Saturdays.” Keith replies, “No, I know it’ll be open. I was just there two 
weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.”5 
 
Looking at cases like Bank-Low we are then asked, “Is the subject’s attribution of 
knowledge true?” Following standard knowledge-attributing practices, it seems 
appropriate to say that Keith is correct when he says he knows the bank will be 
open the following day. His recent visit, in conjunction with the implicit idea that 
banks keep consistent hours and the fact he has no reason to think this bank won’t 
be open, seems sufficient evidence for believing it will be open the following day. 
                                                             





Moving to a second scenario, DeRose increases the stakes while also 
presenting an alternative outcome that was not discussed in the first scenario: 
Bank-High: Keith’s wife reminds him that they have just written a very 
large and very important check. If their paychecks are not deposited into 
their checking account before Monday morning, the important check they 
wrote will bounce, leaving them in a very bad situation. And, of course, the 
bank is not open on Sunday. She then points out that, “Banks do change 
their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as 
confident as he was before that the bank will be open, Keith replies, “Well, 
no, I don’t know. I’d better go in and make sure.”6 
 
Following standard knowledge attributing practices, it seems appropriate to say 
that Keith doesn’t know the bank will be open. Putting the two cases together, we 
get the following: 
 (KB) Keith knows the bank will be open. 
 (~KB) Keith doesn’t know the bank will be open. 
Explaining the shift from attributing to denying knowledge is the primary focus 
of contextualism. As discussed earlier, contextualists argue that the best 
explanation of this shift is a change in the truth-conditions for ‘know’. As a result, 
each speaker has expressed a different proposition. When Keith claims to know in 
Bank-Low, the standards for attributing knowledge are lower and he does know. 
However, in Bank-High the change in circumstances—increase of risk and 
alternative possibility the bank changed its hours—results in a change in the 
                                                             
6 ibid, 2. Again, this example has been slightly modified from the original. Note that the stipulation he 
“remains as confident as before” is original to DeRose’s example. I find this claim to be suspect but will not 





standards for knowledge while Keith’s evidence/reasons remain the same. So, 
Keith doesn’t know in Bank-High. 
§1.4 First-person cases and Invariantism 
Recall that invariantists hold the truth-conditions for ‘know’ do not vary. 
On this view, any attribution or denial of knowledge must satisfy the context-
independent truth-conditions for ‘know’ thus putting it at odds with the 
contextualist view. So, if the contextualist view discussed in 1.3 is correct, 
invariantism is false. Yet, due to the nature of first-person cases, there are 
‘traditionalist-friendly’ explanations available which we will explore in this 
section.   
 One plausible explanation for the change is that Keith simply doesn’t 
believe he knows the bank will be open after considering the alternative possibility 
raised by his wife. This explanation is further supported by the fact that he says 
“Well, no, I don’t know.” It is difficult to see what would justify attributing 
knowledge to someone when they (sincerely) deny that they know. My point here 
is not to rule out any possibility of knowledge despite sincerely believing 
otherwise.7  However, in most cases, denying that you know p is a good indication 
that you do not, in fact, know. If that is correct, it would go a long way to 
supporting the explanation that Keith simply doesn’t believe he knows in the 
context of Bank-High.  
                                                             
7 Bruce Russell pointed out in conversation one example; a student in an epistemology class might find 
herself perplexed enough when discussing skepticism to deny that she knows despite still knowing. It seems 




Now we have a plausible reason to explain the change between that context 
and Bank-Low. Is our problem then solved? We do have an explanation for the 
shift, but unfortunately, that won’t settle the debate between contextualism and 
the traditional view. Even if Keith has lost belief, there is still the question of 
whether he would know if he claimed to know. In other words, if Keith replied 
instead “I know the bank will be open—I was just there!” would we be inclined to 
attribute knowledge? If the answer is yes, then the contextualist explanation is 
weakened. If no, then the traditionalist view is weakened. We’ll address this point 
more in depth in chapter 2. For now, it is important to see that looking solely at 
whether Keith believes does not settle the issue in favor of either the contextualist 
or invariantist. 
Also relevant is that Keith’s wife raises the possibility the bank has changed 
its hours. In turn, Keith accepts her suggestion as significant enough to call into 
question his reliance on the recent visit as evidence the bank is open. This point is 
like the previous on changing belief. But whereas the change of belief aspect is 
somewhat controversial, it is obvious that Bank-High introduces new information 
to the subject. When new information is introduced into a situation, there is an 
inherent change in one’s epistemic position—assuming, of course, that the person 
is aware of the new information and its connection to the belief in question. This 
doesn’t immediately imply that Keith’s epistemic position has been weakened, 
however. One might have good reason to disregard the new information or 




expect from someone who has taken the alternative seriously and lacks—or at least 
believes that they lack—further reasons or evidence against it.  
If someone believed they had good reason to reject an alternative 
suggestion, then we would expect that person to defend their position.8  Looking 
back at Bank-Low, this is precisely what happens.9  Keith’s wife asks how he 
knows the bank will be open and he responds by noting that he visited this exact 
bank on a Saturday no less than two weeks prior.  But once she makes salient the 
fact that banks sometimes change their hours, he is without recourse (or so it 
seems). The moral of this is that a change in Keith’s epistemic position toward “The 
bank will be open” is a plausible explanation for why he denies that he knows. 
This seems right for two reasons. First, new information has been introduced to 
the context and, second, Keith denies that he knows. Since it is natural to assume 
that someone who denies they know also believes they lack evidence to justify 
belief, it looks as if Keith claims he doesn’t know because he no longer believes he 
has sufficient evidence to support his prior belief that the bank will be open. It is 
possible that new information doesn’t automatically imply a change in epistemic 
position, but Keith has taken it seriously enough to change his mind about what 
to do and whether he knows the bank will be open. Again, this would imply that 
                                                             
8 Of course, this is only on the assumption that the person is not under threat, duress, or any other 
psychologically or physically limiting factor. 
 




he has either lost belief or his epistemic position has changed and perhaps it is 
both.  
It would be unsurprising for a subject, upon concluding their evidence to 
be unreliable, to then withhold belief. And that seems to be exactly what is 
occurring the Bank Cases. Though DeRose doesn’t agree a loss of belief or change 
in epistemic position is the correct explanation, he does concede that it is a 
possibility: 
Perhaps both the [knowledge-attribution] and the [knowledge-denial] are 
true, not because the semantic standards for ‘knowledge’ vary from one 
case to the next, but because, though the same standards govern both cases, 
the speaker meets those standards in [Bank-Low], but fails to meet those 
same standards in [Bank-High].10 
 
If the same standards govern both cases, as DeRose concedes might be correct, 
then an invariantist understanding of ‘know’ is the better explanation. 
Additionally, a further reason to prefer this account is that it doesn’t resort to 
relying on the idea of varying truth-conditions. Of course, DeRose eventually 
rejects this explanation in favor of his view, but the cohesion with traditionalism 
and avoiding controversial claims about varying truth-conditions, gives further 
support to these ‘traditionalist-friendly’ interpretations.  
As a final point, note that invariantism is consistent with our intuitions of 
each case; that is, the attribution in Bank-Low and denial in Bank-High seem 
correct, but we can account for that in a way that requires no extra work to defend 
                                                             




invariantism. Later, when we look at third-person cases, we’ll find that invariantism 
appears to conflict with our intuitions. That conflict has been a main point of 
contention between contextualists and invariantists. Whereas contextualists argue 
that the best theory should vindicate our intuitions, invariantists argue that there 
are better explanations which retain the ‘intuitiveness of our intuitions’, but are 
also favorable to their view.  
§1.5 Summary of the competing explanations 
In the previous section, we discussed three different interpretations of the 
switch from attributing knowledge in Bank-Low to denying knowledge Bank-
High. Each implies something about broader concerns such as whether there is a 
change in the person’s epistemic position, denial of invariantism, and so on. 
Looking at the table below, the column on the far left indicates the explanation for 
the change from attributing knowledge in the low-stakes case to denying 
knowledge in the high stakes. The top row lists different implications for each of 
the explanations under consideration.  






change in epistemic 
position? 
Compatible with 
change of belief? 
Change of 
belief (COB) 













Perhaps, but brings 
into question why 
changing TCs is 
needed. 
Perhaps, but brings 
into question why 
changing TCs is 
needed. 
 
Note that each explanation seems to be compatible with one another. For example, 
it is quite possible that the subject has changed his belief as well as undergone a 
change in epistemic position. And both a change in belief and epistemic position 
are compatible with changing truth-conditions. Yet, COB and/or CEP suggest 
alternative explanations that are plausible in their own right. Since both plausibly 
occur in the bank cases discussed above, we have very little reason to push our 
explanation beyond one or both explanations.  
DeRose does make a minor attempt to subvert COB by claiming that the 
subject “remains as confident as before”, but this stipulation by DeRose is 
awkward and seems to go against what someone would normally claim in such a 
situation. Even if that does manage to show the subject’s belief remains constant, 
it fails to explain why the new possibility introduced by Keith’s wife (that 
sometimes banks change their hours) does not lead to a change in epistemic 
position.  
So, the bank cases, and first-person cases more generally, can be explained 
quite easily by the traditionalist view. What the contextualist needs to provide is 
a case in which belief and epistemic position do not change—or, at least, it is 
plausible that they do not—and there is a shift from attributing to denying 




focus on the intuitive responses of a third-party who is separate from the speaker’s 
context. In the next section, we’ll discuss how these cases differ from first-person 
cases and why the contextualist believes they provide the best support for their 
view. 
§1.6 Third Person Cases 
As we saw in the last section, our intuitive approval of both the subject’s 
knowledge attribution and denial does not provide adequate support for 
contextualism. Even if those cases do exhibit standard knowledge attributing 
practices, they don’t give us much reason on their own to think the truth-
conditions for ‘know’ vary because they can be explained by a loss of belief or 
change in epistemic position. So contextualists need examples that are more 
favorable to their view and they believe such cases can be found in the form of 
third-person cases.  
In the first-person cases, we are asked whether it seems correct that the 
subject has attributed/denied knowledge to himself. (Again, the subject in the first-
person cases also acts as the attributor.)  Since the shift from attributing to denying 
seems correct, we need to provide an explanation for it. Third-person cases follow 
a similar format but differ in that they separate the role of the attributor from the 
subject and focus on the intuitive correctness of knowledge attributions/denials 
of the attributor who is placed in a different conversational context. As a result, 
the subject is unaware of any new alternatives or increases in practical risk since 




was just those factors that led to the traditional-friendly explanations discussed in 
the previous section (loss of belief, loss of evidence). Since the ‘traditionalist-
friendly’ variables have been removed from the subject, the contextualist argues, 
the best explanation we have left is that the standards for attributing knowledge 
have changed.  
For third-person cases, we are again asked whether the third-person’s 
attributions/denials of the subject are correct. As with the bank cases, the 
assumption has been that it is intuitively correct for the speaker to attribute 
knowledge in the low-stakes scenario but deny knowledge in the high-stakes 
scenario. Here is such a case from Stewart Cohen that will be the basis for our 
discussion: 
Airport: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a 
certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a 
layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if anyone knows whether 
the flight makes any stops. Another passenger, Smith, replies, “I do. I just 
looked at my flight itinerary and there is a stop in Chicago." It turns out that 
Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to meet at 
the Chicago airport. Mary says [to John], “How reliable is that itinerary, 
anyway? It could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule 
since it was printed, etc.," Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t really 
know that the plane will stop in Chicago on the basis of the itinerary. They 
decide to check with the airline.11 
 
Considering the case from Smith’s view, it seems appropriate to say that he does 
know the flight will stop in Chicago (Airport-Low). However, it also seems 
appropriate for Mary and John to conclude neither they nor Smith know the flight 
                                                             





will make a stop in Chicago (Airport-High). So, again, we have two claims that are 
appropriate, but seem to conflict. 
As with the Bank cases, contextualists argue that the change from 
attributing to denying knowledge is best explained in terms of a change in the 
truth-conditions for attributing knowledge. The contextualist explanation gains 
credibility, or so it is claimed, from at least three important differences between 
the Bank Cases and Airport. First, it is obvious that Smith’s practical situation has 
remained constant and so arguing that he has lost confidence in his belief due to a 
change in circumstances doesn’t make much sense. Second, Smith does not deny 
that he knows as Keith does in the bank case. So, explaining the change from 
attributing to denying knowledge as a loss of belief seems implausible as well 
(COB).  
Finally, the subject is unaware of any new information. Though Mary and 
John consider the possibility the itinerary is not reliable, Smith is ignorant of these 
issues. Because of this, it looks like the traditionalist cannot argue Smith’s 
epistemic position has changed in any way (CEP). Doing so would require making 
the somewhat odd claim that Smith’s epistemic position is, “substantially affected 
by such factors as what kind of far-away conversation is taking place about the 
subject.”12  On this point, and the previous two, I agree with DeRose. Clearly, 
Smith’s belief, confidence, and epistemic position have not changed—far-off 
                                                             





conversations don’t have that sort of effect on individuals. If that is the case, then 
invariantism looks to be false—truth-conditions are not invariant across contexts.  
In chapter 2 I argue that this is not the whole story.  Much of this debate has 
been driven by the assumption that any view which validates these intuitions is 
on better footing than a view that does not. To be sure, whether a view validates 
our intuitions is important, but the focus of these debates has been on the intuitions 
from contextualist cases with little discussion of related cases. In chapter 2, I argue 
that once we take these related intuitions into account, contextualism quickly loses 
any ground that it had over invariantism. Most importantly, it refocuses the 
discussion on what is of central importance—whether we have good reason to 
conclude one of the claims is false. Either Smith claims that he knows or Mary and 
John’s claim that he doesn’t know. 
§1.7 Practicalism 
Since the growth of contextualism, several other non-traditional views have 
developed. One alternative approaches cases like Bank and Airport by arguing 
that there is a direct link between knowledge and action. In short, this type of view 
implies that, if it wouldn’t be practically rational to act on p, then you don’t know 
that p. An implication of this view is that practical reasons directly factor into one’s 
justification. Thus, knowing is a product of one’s epistemic or ‘truth-conducive 
reasons’ and their practical reasons as well.  
Practicalism contrasts with intellectualism which holds that only truth-




Since intellectualism is a central component of the traditionalist view, it is 
important that the threat it poses is addressed. Here I will briefly discuss the 
practicalist view of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath and later, in chapter 4, I 
will argue that it is not a sustainable position. 
The central goal of Fantl and McGrath’s view is to provide an answer to the 
threshold problem for a fallibilist view of knowledge. Although the fallibilist takes 
it that knowledge does not require certainty, it is difficult to say exactly how much 
justification one needs for knowledge. Fantl and McGrath think that if we just look 
at how practical reasons factor into one’s justification for belief, we can get a firm 
answer to this problem. Their answer is summed up in the following principle 
which links knowledge to action (note that Փ is a placeholder for both beliefs and 
actions): 
(KJ): If you know p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in Փ-ing, for 
any Փ. 
 
Applying KJ to contextualist cases, Fantl and McGrath (F&M) argue that the 
subject doesn’t know in the high stakes case because their belief is not “warranted 
enough to justify” the action in question. Like the contextualists, F&M hold that 
the switch from attributing to denying knowledge in the contextualist cases cannot 
be explained, at least not fully, by a change in the epistemic position of the subject 
or a loss of confidence/belief. Unlike the contextualists, they explain this loss of 




knowledge. Exactly what this entails will be clarified shortly. First, a bit more 
background. 
In response to KJ, several counterexamples have been offered. For instance, 
Baron Reed asks us to consider a subject who we’ll refer to as Jack.13  Jack is taking 
part of a social experiment and given the option of answering the question “When 
did Caesar die?”14  There is no threat to his life if he chooses not to answer, but if 
he answers and does so incorrectly, they will give him a series of electric shocks. 
If he answers correctly, they will give him a jellybean. Clearly, the risk is not worth 
it, so he says, “I know the answer, but it isn’t worth the risk.” For most—including 
Fantl and McGrath—this seems like an acceptable response.15  Yet, if KJ is right 
and if he knows when Caesar died, then he should be justified in answering. 
Nevertheless, it seems as if he should not answer from which it follows, according 
to KJ, that he does not know when Caesar died even though it seems quite 
appropriate for Jack to claim he does know. 
Unfortunately, this sort of debate tends to get bogged down with arguing 
over which intuitions are correct. For the invariantist, the counter-example seems 
                                                             
13 I’ve modified the case from the original where Reed has the subject state “I remember that Caesar was 
born in 100 BC, but I am not so sure of it that it is worth risking electrocution. Nevertheless, I quietly say to 
myself, ‘I know it’s 100 BC.’” I don’t see why the hedging ‘but I’m not so sure of it’ is needed for reasons 
that will become clear in chapter 3. In short, the point I argue is that knowledge is not sufficient to justify 
action—it must also be ‘worth it’ as Reed slightly indicates here. The problem is that Reed seems to 
understand the ‘worth of it’ as being related to how sure he is when, in fact, it has to do with the ridiculously 
low payoff if he is successful. 
 
14 Reed (2012), 467. 
 





obvious enough, but Fantl and McGrath maintain that the fact that it would seem 
unjustified to act is best explained by a loss of knowledge because the practical 
implications have changed. In chapter 4, I will argue that Fantl and McGrath have 
not adequately addressed these counterexamples. For starters, while the 
traditional view implies that both are true, their view implies that Jack’s claim is 
false and so that can’t merely sidestep that issue by admitting that it seems correct.  
They need to explain why their view is a better explanation given that it implies 
one of the intuitions is false. 
To avoid disputes over the right intuitions, F&M acknowledge that ‘a 
principled argument’ would go much further and so attempt to support KJ with 
more basic principles that they believe match up with ordinary ways in which we 
use knowledge and reasons in our deliberations about what to believe and how to 
act. The first regards the connection between knowledge and reasons—if you 
know p, then p can be a reason for further belief and action: 
Knowledge-Reasons (KR): If you know that p, then p is warranted enough 
to be a reason you have [for Փ-ing], for any Փ.16 
 
And the second states that if p is a reason you have for some further belief or action, 
then it can justify further belief and action: 
 
SafeReasons: If p is a reason you have to Փ, then p is warranted enough to 
justify you in Փ-ing, for any Փ.17 
                                                             
16 Fantl and McGrath (2009), 69. In the original statement of KR, the principle ends with ‘to Փ, for any Փ.” 
A change to “for Փ-ing, for any Փ” comes later in the discussion without mention. Perhaps, just an editorial 
mistake. I don’t see any reason why this change would cause problems for their argument. 
 
17 It’s easy to see that the consequent of KR is not the same as the antecedent of SafeReasons. Fantl and 
McGrath do address this and argue it is not an issue. I will assume they are correct as nothing seems to 






The first of these principles seems relatively uncontroversial and I won’t address 
it any further. The main point of attack will be SafeReasons and, specifically, I will 
argue in chapter 4 that SafeReasons is susceptible to the counterexample Reed first 
used to attack KJ.     
To conclude the chapter, we’ll take a brief look at why KJ implies 
intellectualism is false, but first an important clarification. Each principle 
discussed employs the idea of being ‘warranted’ or ‘warranted enough’. Fantl and 
McGrath explain this to mean that there is  
“no weakness in your epistemic position with respect to p—no weaknesses, 
that is, in your standing on any truth-relevant dimensions with respect to 
p—stand in the way of p justifying you in having further beliefs. We will 
recruit the term ‘warrant’ to express this idea. Knowing that p, as we shall 
say, makes p warranted enough to justify you in believing any q.”18 
 
In the paragraph following, the authors raise the question that most would ask in 
response to the last point: “Any q?” While they agree that a ‘relevant connection’ 
would ‘stand in the way’ of p justifying believing that q in fact, a weakness in 
epistemic position does not. So, it is ‘warranted enough’ in that sense. 
For instance, I know that I’m wearing a blue shirt (b) and it would seem 
there is no ‘truth-relevant weakness’, ordinarily speaking, that stands in the way 
of it justifying further beliefs. Thus, on their account, we can say that b is 
‘warranted enough to justify’ my believing that Paris is the capital of France (c) 
                                                             





although it does not justify c in fact. On Fantl and McGrath’s view, their use of 
‘warrant enough to justify’ implies that a known proposition could justify believing 
any other proposition—and later adding any action—in principle because it is a 
well-justified belief itself.19 But whether it justifies believing any specific 
proposition is an open question and dependent upon other factors—preferences, 
relevance, and so on. With this understanding in mind, let’s discuss the 
implications it has for intellectualism. 
§1.8 KJ and Intellectualism   
KJ acts as a necessary condition on knowledge.20  So, unlike contextualism, 
practicalism is a full-fledged theory about knowledge and not only a semantic-
level theory. As noted above, KJ implies that knowledge of a proposition p requires 
one can put that knowledge to use towards any further belief or action Փ, but this 
does not imply that p will justify Փ all things considered. In many cases, that a 
further action is not practically justified can be explained by other non-epistemic 
factors; for example, the belief may be irrelevant to the act—as it is in the example 
above—or it might be immoral.  
In those instances, p would be ‘warranted enough’ to justify Փ, but the act 
would be still practically irrational. For example, if I am sitting at the bar and see 
                                                             
19 Looking at this idea from a different angle, the point of KJ seems to be something like the following:  
Consider any further belief or action of which p is at least a partial reason and justifiably so. If S knows that 
p, then it seems quite odd to criticize that further belief or action because S lacked justification for p. S may 
lack justification for believing that p supported the belief or action or there may be some other reason 
(practical or moral) for criticism, but it wouldn’t be because their belief that p lacked sufficient justification. 
 
20 Put another way, KJ implies that knowing p is sufficient to justify acting on p. In chapter 3 I argue that this 




a beer sitting on the table before me, I know there is a beer next me. But let’s say I 
am the designated driver for the evening. Clearly, I should not take a drink. Is the 
right explanation for this that there is a weakness in my justification for believing 
there is a beer sitting before me? Of course not—it is the fact I shouldn’t drink 
because I am the designated driver. So, it isn’t as if KJ implies that p must be 
warranted to justify Փ-ing no matter what; that is, no matter what the non-epistemic 
factors might be (e.g. the moral permissibility of the action). As with any 
assessment of practical rationality, those factors must be satisfied as well.  
The problematic case for intellectualism occurs when the epistemic factors 
between two agents are the same, and yet it only seems practically rational for one 
of the subjects to act upon p. If KJ is true, then one knows p and the other does not, 
even though they have the same evidence for p. To make their case against 
intellectualism, Fantl and McGrath offer an example that meets these conditions. 
The example begins with two people who’ve both planned trips to Foxboro.  The 
first, Matt, is sight-seeing and prefers Foxboro, but wouldn’t mind Providence 
either.21  The express train would take him straight to Providence, but the local 
will stop in Foxboro first and then head on to Providence.  So, either train really 
isn’t an issue, but Matt is looking at the 201 and we are to assume that he knows it 
is the local (it is) and so he knows it will take him to his preferred destination of 
Foxboro. It seems perfectly reasonably for Matt to board the train without further 
                                                             





inquiry. To put it in the language of KJ, there is no weakness in Matt’s justification 
for “the 201 is the local” to prevent it from justifying him to board the train. 
On the other hand, Jeremy needs to attend a meeting in Foxboro. If he 
accidentally got on the express, then he would be late and most likely lose out on 
a huge and important sale. He is also looking at the 201 and has the same evidence 
as Matt, but it seems that he should be more careful—he ought to double check to 
make sure that it is the local before boarding. Again, in the language of KJ, it seems 
there is a weakness in Jeremy’s justification which ‘stands in the way’ and so 
would not justify his boarding the train; i.e. the consequent of KJ is not satisfied. 
Since it would not justify him boarding the train, KJ implies that Jeremy doesn’t 
know the 201 is the local. 
The ‘Train Case’ attempts to provide an example much like the Bank Cases 
and Airport. As before, we have two subjects with the same evidence, two 
choices—one that maximizes their interests against one that does not, and only 
one subject is justified to act. For Fantl and McGrath, knowledge is restricted by 
what it can practically justify which implies that practical reasons will factor into 
our epistemic evaluations in certain cases. This also suggests that practical reasons 
can be cited to justify or deny knowledge. For example, in the Train Case, one 
could say to Jeremy “You don’t know it is the local—there is simply too much at 
stake!” To my ears, this sounds quite odd. Perhaps it is true that Jeremy doesn’t 




seems to go against both a theoretical understanding of knowledge as well as 




Chapter 2: Knowledge Attributions and Mistakes 
Introduction 
In the current debate over knowledge attributions, both invariantists and 
epistemic contextualists agree that ordinary speakers tend to use the term ‘know’ 
appropriately. The disagreement begins when discussing the truth-values of these 
sorts of cases in which there is a shift from knowledge being attributed to a subject 
and then denied. Contextualists argue these changes occur due to a shift in the 
standards for uses of ‘know’. On their view, both the attribution and denial are true 
despite an apparent conflict between them. Invariantists, however, deny that 
epistemic standards will vary, and they deny that context is relevant to the 
standards for knowledge and knowledge attributing sentences.  
For the invariantist, explaining the responses to cases like Bank and Airport 
will require that at least one of the claims is false. Some argue this sort of 
explanations should be avoided because they imply we intuitively judge a false 
claim to be appropriate and even true. But invariantists are not alone as 
contextualism leads to similar issues. For instance, when looking at cases like 
Cohen’s Airport (see 1.4), it certainly appears as if the knowledge denial and 
attribution are at odds since Smith’s claim to know the plane will land in Chicago 
seems to contradict Mary’s claim that he does not. Attempts to explain away this 
intuition also imply that we don’t know how terms like ‘know’ function even if we 




provide a plausible explanation for why the denial and attribution appear 
contradictory but are in fact not.  
Putting this all together, we end up with are three intuitive claims: that 
Smith knows, that Mary is correct to deny he does, and that those two claims are 
contradictory. If they are in fact contradictory, then a case like Airport provides no 
evidence for contextualism since one of the two claims is false. To regain support 
from these cases, the contextualist will need to show that Smith and Mary’s claims 
are not contradictory. That is easier said than done, and I argue that the prospects 
are dim. 
Turning to defend the invariantist view, I argue that we have good reason 
to conclude either Smith or Mary’s claim is false. To motivate this position, I 
discuss modified versions of the Airport case in which Mary either has or lacks 
support for her denial. If Mary’s denial is well-supported, then we have reason to 
conclude that Mary’s denial is true, and Smith’s claim is false despite his initial 
claim and our intuitive response. Smith’s mistake is obvious in this example since 
he is unaware of some key facts relevant to his situation. If Mary’s denial not well-
supported, then we have good reason to conclude that Smith’s initial claim is true. 
In this case, the mistake occurs because Mary’s denial rests on overestimating the 
probability of the alternative outcome.  
If I am right, we don’t have a plausible basis for rejecting the claim that 
Smith and Mary are contradicting each other. However, we do have a plausible 




Mary has for her denial. Thus, we have good reason to hold onto the invariantist 
view. 
§2.1 Knowledge Attributions and Mistakes  
 Epistemic contextualism is the view that the truth-conditions for sentences 
which attribute or deny knowledge vary according to context-relative features.22 
In the first chapter we discussed some of the problems a contextualist faces when 
supporting their view with subject-based examples. For instance, it is difficult to 
devise a case that doesn’t seem to imply a loss of belief on the part of the subject. 
If the truth of ‘S does not know that p” can be explained by loss of belief, then the 
case provides no evidence for contextualism. As a result, the most widely held 
version of contextualism is attributor contextualism whereby the context of a third-
party, i.e. the attributor, determines the relevant truth-conditions. A prominent 
example comes from Stewart Cohen’s Airport case discussed in section 1.4. Here 
it is again for review: 
Airport: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a 
certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a 
layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if anyone knows whether 
the flight makes any stops. Another passenger, Smith, replies, “I do. I just 
looked at my flight itinerary and there is a stop in Chicago." It turns out that 
Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to meet at 
the Chicago airport. Mary says [to John], “How reliable is that itinerary, 
anyway? It could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule 
since it was printed, etc.," Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t really 
know that the plane will stop in Chicago on the basis of the itinerary. They 
decide to check with the airline.”23 
                                                             
22 See DeRose (1999) for a discussion of the varieties of contextualism. 
 






Considering the case from Smith’s view it seems appropriate (i.e. ‘correct usage’) 
to say he does know the flight will stop in Chicago. He has little at stake, itineraries 
are generally reliable and there is no reason to question this fact. For ease, we will 
take LOW to refer Smith’s low-risk claim to know. However, it also seems 
appropriate for Mary and John to conclude that Smith does not know the flight 
will make a stop in Chicago. They have a lot at stake and they have also raised the 
possibility that the itinerary is not reliable. We will refer to Mary and John’s denial 
as HIGH.  
So, we have two claims that both seem appropriate, but that also seem to 
conflict. As with the Bank cases (see 1.3), contextualists argue that the change from 
attributing to denying knowledge is best explained in terms of a change in the 
truth-conditions for attributing knowledge. Because Mary and John have more at 
stake, the truth-conditions for knowledge are higher as compared to Smith.24 This 
suggestion implies that, not only are these claims appropriate, they are also true.25 
DeRose explains:  
As we can see [from cases such as Bank and Airport] … speakers do in fact 
use ‘know(s)’ in the way described [that is, in the way that contextualists 
contend are the standard responses to their cases] and appropriately so – 
they will in fact, and with apparent propriety, ascribe ‘knowledge’ in 
situations like [Bank-Low], yet will deny ‘knowledge’ when they find 
                                                             
24 It may also be the result of the additional alternative considered by Mary and John. This raises the 
question of how that alternative would affect Smith. We’ll discuss these issues more directly in chapter 3. 
 
25 For a fuller defense of this claim see, see chapter 5 of DeRose (2009) and also his (1999). Cohen discusses 





themselves in conversational circumstances like [Bank-High]. This 
supports the premises that both of the imagined claims are true...26 
 
And elsewhere: 
…if a serious assertion is appropriate, that strongly suggests the intuition 
that it is true, at least from the speaker’s point of view. (And if the speaker 
isn’t mistaken about any underlying facts, that the claim is simply true).27 
 
I agree with DeRose that appropriateness is a good indication of truth. If it wasn’t, 
we humans would be in a bad position, as far as language use is concerned, since 
appropriateness is something of a base-line indication that we understand the 
‘give-and-take’ of ordinary conversation. To put that differently, if our intuitions 
about appropriate usage fail to indicate language use that is generally correct and 
meaningful, it is difficult to see what in fact would indicate correct usage. Thus, 
when usage seems appropriate, we should give it the benefit of the doubt and 
assume it is true unless we have good reason to say otherwise. 
However, granting truth from appropriateness comes with a caveat—the 
claim cannot rest on a mistake—a point which DeRose recognizes in the 
parenthetical “if the speaker isn’t mistaken about any underlying facts.”28 If it turns 
out that one of the intuitive responses to the Airport cases does rest on a mistake, 
that would suggest one of the claims is false and it would vindicate invariantism. 
On the other hand, if there isn’t a mistake, that would suggest both claims are true 
                                                             
26 DeRose (2005), 173-174. 
 
27 Ibid, 175. 
 





and so vindicate the contextualist’s claim that these cases provide good evidence 
for their view. 
To be sure, the claims made in examples like Bank and Airport seem 
appropriate and invariantism does require that one is false. But DeRose assumes 
too much when he claims, “it’s a bad strike” simply if it rules LOW or HIGH to be 
false.29 Claiming one or the other to be false isn’t a problem, in itself, but doing so 
without identifying where a mistake has occurred that raises an issue. So, to avoid a 
‘bad strike’, the invariantist must show that a mistake has occurred and do so in a 
way that is charitable to our intuitions.  
§2.2 A Contradiction between the Cases? 
Bank and Airport provide some prima facie support for contextualism since 
both the attribution and denial seem correct. However, if we expand our 
discussion to one case further, we’ll find an ordinary and intuitive example that 
provides support for invariantism. The ordinary case I have in mind is one in 
which an additional subject, Carl, suggests that Smith and Mary/John are 
contradicting each other. Upon overhearing all involved, Carl says, “Mary and 
John are contradicting Smith. Both can’t be right.” Carl’s statement in this 
example—which I’ll refer to as CON—seems appropriate; that is, it does seem as 
if the two parties are contradicting each other even though it appears both 
                                                             





statements are appropriate and perhaps even seem to be true when considered 
separately.  
Following DeRose’s point above that appropriateness “strongly suggests 
the intuition… is true” and given the fact that Carl’s statement is appropriate, we 
ought to accept that Carl’s statement is, in fact, true. At least, we ought to accept it 
as true unless we can identify a mistake Carl has made. If we can’t, then the cases 
are not immediately of help to the contextualist because the truth of Carl’s 
statement implies that either LOW or HIGH is false.  Denying that CON is true 
without good reason would result in the same ‘bad strike’ criticism for 
contextualists that was previously brought against invariantists. (To be sure, 
invariantists don’t win by default as they will need to show that either LOW or 
HIGH rests on a mistake.) So, the task for contextualists is to show that Carl has 
made a mistake because their view implies that what he said is false.30 
Granted that the appropriateness and possible truth of LOW and HIGH 
does raise the possibility that contextualism is the correct theory. However, once 
we take CON into consideration, it is clear we cannot isolate LOW and HIGH to 
attack the invariantist position since that would require assuming LOW and HIGH 
are true, and CON implies that is not the case. In short, some further support is 
                                                             
30 What sort of mistake would result in an attribution being false? Of course, if the fact in question was 
false, it would rest upon a mistake (though not necessarily a mistake for which the subject or attributor is 
epistemically responsible). The subject or attributor may have a mistaken belief regarding, as DeRose puts 
it, “a relevant underlying matter of fact.”(2005, 173) For example, they might possess some misleading 
evidence, wrongly believe some fact to support their claim that does not in fact support it, or be unaware 





needed that does not come from assuming LOW and HIGH are true. Moreover, 
since contextualism implies that CON is false, that suggests we fail to recognize 
an important aspect of the way we employ ‘know’. Claims like LOW and HIGH 
ordinarily seem to represent competing claims, but if contextualists are right, that 
is not the case. So, in addition to showing that there is a mistake, an explanation 
as to why we think CON is appropriate and even true is required. 
Contextualists have attempted to explain away this problem by suggesting 
we make similar mistakes in other aspects of our language use. Stewart Cohen 
points out that we often express sentences which seem to contradict at first glance, 
but if the issues are clarified we will recognize they do not and so the contradiction 
was only apparent.31 For example, consider that two people might debate over 
whether a 6’1 male is tall and thus think there is an actual contradiction between 
“S is tall” and “S is not tall”. However, once it is clarified that the first speaker 
means ‘tall generally’ and the later speaker means ‘tall for an NBA player’, what 
seemed to be a contradiction initially is quickly recognized to have been a simple 
misunderstanding. Cohen suggests that we make the same sort of mistake when 
thinking the knowledge denial and attribution in cases like Airport contradict. 
There only seems to be a conflict until we clarify that LOW is true relative to a ‘low-
risk standard’ for knowledge and HIGH is true relative to a ‘high-risk standard’. 
                                                             





There are three problems with this response. The first, is that we do not find 
similarities in ordinary use between the apparent contradictions of ‘tall’ 
mentioned by Cohen and the sort of contradiction pointed out by Carl. Quite 
unlike the clarifications which occur in the ‘tall’ example, a contradiction between 
uses of ‘know’ does not seem to dissipate after explaining the apparent 
contradiction as simply a misunderstanding about what standards are at play. For 
example, it would be unordinary if Smith clarified to Mary and John, “Oh, I meant 
that I know relative to a low-standards context” and Mary and John replied with 
a similar remark about the high-standard context when denying that Smith knows. 
To add to that, it would also seem odd if they agreed that Smith truly knows C 
relative to his context, but not Mary and John’s.   
Finally, arguing that ‘know’ is analogous to ‘tall’ requires an entirely new 
indirect argument to show that there is in fact an analogy between ‘know’ and 
‘tall’. Recall that contextualists initially compared ‘tall’ and ‘know’ simply to 
clarify how ‘know’ is to be understood on their view. ‘Know’ seems to have some 
similarities to certain terms already acknowledged to be context-sensitive and that 
helps to clarify the contextualist position. Surely, that was helpful in explaining 
their view. However, the contextualist was not claiming ‘tall’ has properties x, y, 
and z and ‘know’ has properties x and y, therefore ‘know’ has property z as well. 
The point was simply that ‘tall’ exhibits certain properties which are context-
dependent and that is what they mean by saying that ‘know’ is context-dependent; 




Using ‘tall’ as an example isn’t an issue, of course, because it is only to 
clarify their position. However, once analogies to ‘tall’ are offered to explain away 
apparent contradictory uses of ‘know’, we must assume that ‘know’ is context-
dependent for the analogy to work. At the outset, the only reason we have to 
conclude ‘know’ is an indexical term comes from cases like Bank and Airport. 
Since the truth-values of these claims are up for debate, they provide little 
assistance in showing that ‘know’ is an indexical term.  So, the contextualist first 
needs support for the claim that ‘know’ is indexical independently. Only then 
could an analogy to tall be made to explain away the problem with CON such that 
the explanation applied to apparent contradictory uses of ‘tall’ will also apply to 
‘know’. Absent this step, the contextualist can, at best, offer the analogy to ‘tall’ as 
an example of how we could explain apparently contradictory uses of ‘know’ if 
‘know’ is an indexical term like ‘tall’. 
This leads us to the second problem with Cohen’s argument, and the 
contextualist view in general. Because CON raises the possibility that either LOW 
or HIGH is false, the contextualist cannot offer the original cases in support 
without addressing the problem raised by CON. So, Cohen must show that ‘know’ 
is context-sensitive without the support of cases like Airport since. Given any 
attempt to use LOW and HIGH to support contextualism, the invariantist can 
simply point to the equally intuitive CON in response. (To be sure, LOW and 




own concerns.) So, the cases don’t provide uncontested support for contextualism 
until CON is addressed; that is, until a mistake in CON has been identified.32 
Can contextualists respond by putting forward an indirect argument? That 
is an option, of course, but it is important to note this move would open the 
discussion to further debates over the significant differences between uncontested 
context-sensitive terms and ‘know’—in fact, DeRose specifically avoided offering 
an indirect argument for this very reason:33 
Note that this argument from ordinary usage [i.e. contextualist cases] is not 
an indirect argument that takes as its premise that some other term, like 
‘tall’, is context-sensitive, and then argues that because ‘know(s)’ is so 
similar to ‘tall’, ‘know(s)’ too is context-sensitive. Such an indirect argument 
would be very insecure, in my opinion, because, while there are very 
important similarities between the behaviors of ‘tall’ and ‘know’, there are 
also many important differences.34 
 
The main difference between ‘tall’ and ‘know’—which DeRose points out shortly 
following this passage—is that the former is an adjective and the latter a verb. In 
addition to this point, Jason Stanley discusses a number of further differences in 
his paper “On the Case for Contextualism”. For instance, he points out that ‘know’ 
doesn’t allow for modifiers in the same way as standard context-sensitive terms. 
                                                             
32 One might respond that invariantists have the same issue; that is, they cannot use CON to argue against 
LOW or HIGH. That thought is entirely correct, and it must be clear that I am not arguing CON rules out the 
possibility that both LOW and HIGH are true. At this point, CON has merely raised that possibility and, as a 
result, shown that contextualists have a difficult issue of their own to address that is on par with the 
invariantists concern with LOW and HIGH. Further argument, independent of relying on the cases, is needed 
to support either view. This point will be taken up in section 2.3 and those following. 
 
33 DeRose points out one significant difference: ‘know’ is a verb and ‘tall’ is an adjective. 
 





Phrases such as “very tall” are quite natural whereas “very knows” is not. ‘Know’ 
also resists ‘comparative modifications’. Whereas ‘Sam is taller than Stan’ is an 
ordinary formulation, neither “Sam is knower than Stan” nor “Sam knower than 
Stan” are found in ordinary use.35 If the contextualist is to make an indirect 
argument, then these dissimilarities between ‘know’ and words like ‘tall’ need to 
be explained. Without first explaining why these dissimilarities are not an issue, 
we have little reason to think the analogy between contradictory uses of ‘tall’ and 
‘know’ will be successful.36  
Certainly, there is room left to discuss an indirect argument and my point 
isn’t that an indirect argument cannot be successful. Rather, the point is that there 
are good reasons to think its success is unlikely because of the significant 
dissimilarities between context-sensitive terms and ‘know’. Even if an indirect 
argument does work in some capacity, the fact is that applying the same 
explanation of apparent contradictory uses of ‘know’ is simply not intuitive as it 
is with apparently contradictory uses of ‘tall’.  So, the contextualist still needs to 
explain why we fail to understand the context sensitivity of ‘know’ or recognize 
                                                             
35 We do use some phrases such as “Sam knows more than Stan”, but this sentence commonly refers to 
having more knowledge of independent facts rather than ‘knowing more’ than another about a particular 
fact. Even so, there isn’t anything odd about saying that someone knows something better than another. 
The invariantists is not at all committed to holding that every knower knows to the same degree. The 
position is simply that the baseline for knowledge is invariant for every possible (and actual) knower. 
 
36 While ‘know’ doesn’t seem open to these modifications, ‘confidence’ is compatible with them. This 
comparison might be an interesting route to pursue by those invariantists who argue that there is a loss of 




apparent contradictory uses of the term between the sort of uses found in cases 
like Bank and Airport. 
Moving forward, we have two favorable reasons to explore an explanation 
of the cases which is consistent with the invariantist view. First, there is the fact 
that LOW and HIGH are intuitively contradictory. Contextualists have taken cases 
like Bank and Airport to support their view, but the natural addition of CON 
shows that the dialectical situation is not so much in favor of contextualism as they 
have taken it to be. I don’t mean to imply that invariantism is better off in light of 
this issue, but, at the very least, contextualists and invariantists are on even 
footing. Second, contextualists have yet to offer a plausible reason to conclude 
CON is false. These two points are enough to quell the thought that invariantists 
are in a worse position with cases like Airport. The fact of the matter is that CON 
is just as, if not more, intuitive than LOW and HIGH. The task here is, of course, 
to show that invariantism is the better view. With that in mind, the following 
sections will focus on the possibility that either LOW or HIGH rests on a mistake. 
§2.3: The General Strategy and A Contextualist Rebuttal.  
Consider again the events in Airport-High. Mary raises the alternative 
possibility that Smith’s itinerary is not as reliable as he takes it to be. Given the 
high stakes and the fact the alternative could be true, the denial looks to be 
appropriate. So, what could be the mistake in these cases? The point I wish to 




overestimate the probability of this possibility. If correct, we have identified a 
mistake in HIGH which indicates that HIGH is false, and LOW is true.  
Once the alternate possibility is supported with good reasons, we then have 
good reason to deny that Smith knows and so conclude that LOW is false. So, 
based on the reasons supporting the alternate possibility we have one of two 
options: if the alternative possibility lacks support, HIGH is false, but if it has good 
support, LOW is false. If correct, this result would vindicate the invariantist 
position and it would do so intuitively because we would have good reason to 
conclude one of the claims rests on a mistake. 
To support this conclusion, the strategy is as follows: first, we’ll look at two 
modified versions of the Airport case. In one case, Mary offers an unlikely 
possibility—the itinerary is not reliable because aliens may have attacked Chicago 
and now the plane has been rerouted. Even though Mary raises an alternative 
possibility and the stakes are high, the right conclusion is that Smith knows the 
plane will land in Chicago despite these concerns and Mary and John’s claim that 
he does not.  In the second case, Mary suggests that the itinerary is not reliable 
because the Airline has been experiencing issues with its printer software the last 
few weeks. In this instance, it seems right to say Mary and John’s denial that Smith 
knows is true because they have offered sufficient reason to question the itinerary. 
However, once we become aware of the printer issue, it also seems right to say 
that we made a mistake by first attributing knowledge to Smith. Looking at all 




case in that Mary and John lack sufficient support for the possibility that they raise. 
So, it is of no threat to Smith’s claim to know in either context.  
Before diving into the main argument, I must briefly address one lingering 
issue. Contextualists often argue that we should keep the cases separate and, in 
some sense, isolate our intuitions for the individual cases. In a footnote, DeRose 
writes: 
Of course, we may begin to doubt the intuitions above [regarding the Bank 
case] when we consider them together, wondering whether the claim to 
know in the first case and the admission that I don’t know in the second can 
really both be true. But when the cases are considered individually, the 
intuitions are quite strong, and, in any case, the linguistic behavior 
displayed in the cases quite clearly does accurately reflect how ‘I know’/’I 
don’t know’ is in fact used.37 
 
DeRose’s point seems to be that, upon first considering each case individually, we 
have good reason to accept our intuitions because of their strength in conjunction 
with ordinary use. So, I might be accused of simply engaging with such 
comparisons and thus ignoring these concerns and ruling out contextualism from 
the start by assuming that there is an unresolvable clash between LOW and HIGH. 
In response to this charge, I will make two points. First, we must keep in 
mind the intuitiveness of CON. Though the contextualist argues we shouldn’t 
draw comparisons, the intuitive appropriateness of CON implies that is exactly 
what we should do, and it is something which is a part of our ordinary use of 
‘know’. Without showing that CON is false, the contextualist has given us no 
                                                             





reason to ignore the intuitiveness of this claim and so conclude that comparing 
LOW and HIGH is legitimate.  
Second, it would be a misunderstanding to think I am comparing various 
claims in a way that implicitly rules out contextualism. The reason is that my 
conclusion is not based on comparing the cases, but rather, by simply evaluating 
the reasons that support LOW and HIGH individually. To be sure, our assessment 
of one claim will have implications for the other, but the argument does not begin 
and proceed by comparing these cases and assuming one of them must be wrong. 
Looking just at high, for instance, the assessment will be entirely in terms of Mary 
and John’s belief concerning the alternative possibility and their reasons supporting 
that belief.  
Finally, as much as the contextualist cases accurately reflect linguistic 
behavior of ‘know’, surely reasoning about and assessing such claims individually is 
equally reflective of this behavior. In fact, this is precisely what occurs in the high 
stakes cases since the attributors raise and consider further possibilities. Since the 
contextualist cases already engage with this sort of ordinary reasoning, it would 
be inconsistent for them to argue that additional cases are not admissible into the 
discussion.38 Even more so if the additional data ends up providing a more 
                                                             
38 This last thought also addresses a point DeRose often raises about the ‘best cases’— cases in which there 
is little to no debate and the separate contexts don’t converge in some sense. Surely, those are the best 
cases for contextualists, but I see no independent reason to accept that the debate between contextualists 





intuitive understanding of the original cases and ordinary uses of ‘know’, in 
general. 
§2.4: The Mistake in Contextualist Cases. 
Let’s turn to the first variation of the Airport example in which Mary and 
John raise an unlikely possibility: 
Alien-Airport: Two alien enthusiasts, Mary and John, are at the L.A. airport 
contemplating taking a certain flight to New York. They want to know 
whether the flight has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if 
anyone knows whether the flight makes any stops. A passenger, Smith, 
replies, “I do. I just looked at my flight itinerary and there is a stop in 
Chicago." It turns out that Mary and John have a very important business 
contact they have to meet at the Chicago airport. Mary says [to John], “It is 
possible that aliens have attacked Chicago – if that is the case, the plane will 
need to reroute to somewhere else. How do we know that hasn’t happened? 
We should go check to make sure." Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t 
really know that the plane will stop in Chicago on the basis of the 
itinerary.39 
This example is a bit extreme, but it is important that we have a case in which the 
knowledge denial is obviously false. (At least, in ordinary circumstances it would 
be obviously false.) Mary and John think that the possibility of the alien attack is 
enough to conclude Smith doesn’t know C (land in Chicago) because A (alien 
attack) undermines Smith’s evidence I (the itinerary) for C. But A is wholly 
ineffective as a defeater of Smith’s evidence.40 So, despite raising the alternative 
possibility A, Smith knows that C. 
                                                             
39 As noted, this is a modified version of Cohen’s original case from his article “Contextualism and 
Skepticism” (2000). 
 
40 The skeptic may want to push back here and argue that A is enough to undermine I. Something should 
be said about hyperbolic skeptical worries, but we must remember here that the focus is on ordinary, 




This seems right, but why isn’t the alternative enough to undermine I? To 
put that differently, if Mary and John’s knowledge denial is false in Alien-Airport, 
upon what mistake does their false claim rest? Two issues come to mind. First, she 
has offered no reason to think an alien attack will occur or has occurred in this 
instance. Instead, she simply mentions the possibility. Second, given our 
background reasons, including what we know about our little part of the universe, 
that we have little reason to think aliens exist or that they have visited earth, we 
have good reason to reject the idea that such an event is likely to occur.41 As a 
result, it stands to reason that Smith’s itinerary retains its status as being reliable 
and Smith knows that C even in Mary and John’s context. So, A fails to undermine 
Smith’s evidence I because A itself lacks sufficient epistemic support and, 
furthermore, we have sufficient reason to reject A. 
I take it that this explanation of Alien-Airport will satisfy most readers, but 
there is an underlying point that will become more important once we turn to the 
original Airport example. Clearly, Mary and John’s belief that A is mistaken 
because A is very unlikely. However, their belief that A is possible, in the strictest 
sense, is surely true. So, it might look as if denying that Smith knows C isn’t based 
                                                             
41 Throughout this chapter and chapter 3, I’ve assumed an objective view of the relevant probabilities. I 
take these probabilities to be based on the background evidence relevant to the issue at hand (e.g. the 
probability of an alien attack) and any relevant evidence directly stated in the examples. To be sure, there 
will be disagreements over how probable an event might be. However, in such cases, that merely implies a 
disagreement over the subject’s epistemic position and so it is not directly relevant to this discussion. An 
important goal of these examples is to invoke probabilities which are relatively uncontroversial and, for a 
case like Alien-Airport, the significant lack of any evidence supports the claim that the probability is very 
low. Since it is low, a belief that it is probable will be false. This sort of reasoning seems to be on par with 




on a false belief. However, the knowledge denial isn’t simply based on the idea 
that the alien attack is possible, but it seems that they also believe the alien attack 
has a sufficiently high probability. In other words, Mary and John are using 
‘possible’ in the sense that is often used in ordinary conversation. So, they believe 
it is a likely alternative to C. 
If we consider the alternative—that is, if we assume they believe A has a 
very low probability—it would be odd for them to give it any attention and then 
deny that Smith knows. For instance, assume that there is a one in a million chance 
of the alien attack and Mary states something like the following: 
There is a one in a million chance that Aliens have attacked Chicago. How 
can we be sure that hasn’t happened or won’t happen? Smith’s itinerary 
doesn’t rule that out. So, he doesn’t know the plane will land in Chicago. 
 
Though she acknowledges the low probability of the alien attack, Mary’s claim in 
this passage is disingenuous. In everyday situations—even risky ones—such 
incredibly poor odds are not something we sincerely consider. So, it isn’t just 
possible alternatives that are of concern, but alternatives for which we have reason 
to think the probability of the alternative is sufficient to raise concern that the 
itinerary is not reliable. 
The other option is that Mary and John have greatly overestimated the 
probability of the alien attack and so believe that it is likely enough to warrant 
sincere consideration. If that is the case, then Mary and John do hold a false belief. 




If correct, then the knowledge denial in Alien-Airport rests upon the mistaken 
belief that A is sufficiently likely to present a legitimate alternative to C.    
 So, we have one case in which the attributor, Mary, denies that Smith knows 
C, but the denial is false, and it rests upon a mistake (i.e. a false belief). Now we 
turn to a case in which the alternative comes with good epistemic support and the 
attributor does not make a mistake: 
Printer-Airport: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking 
a certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a 
layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if anyone knows whether 
the flight makes any stops. A passenger named Smith replies, “I do. I just 
looked at my flight itinerary and there is a stop in Chicago." It turns out that 
Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to meet at 
the Chicago airport. Mary says [to John], “You know, I just read in the 
newspaper yesterday that this airline has recently made a lot of mistakes 
on their itineraries. Something about their new printing software that is 
causing problems and they are trying to work out the bugs. So, I’m not so 
sure we can take that itinerary as reliable." Mary and John agree that Smith 
doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in Chicago on the basis of the 
itinerary. They decide to check with the airline. 
 
The first thing to notice about Airline Printer is that Mary and John provide some 
reason to support the possibility that the itinerary is not reliable. Of course, they 
do so in Airline Alien as well. However, in this instance Mary and John’s reasons 
support rejecting I since the airline has had trouble with their printing software 
lately. Thus, their worry that the itinerary contains an error is reasonable and, 
given the strong reasons cited against it, denying that Smith knows is both 
appropriate and true even though it is in fact true the plane will land in Chicago. 
Yet, if Smith’s claim to know is false, that implies he has made a mistake which 




reasoned incorrectly. Rather, he is simply ignorant of the fact that his itinerary is 
not reliable. 
 This leads to a concern about the effect that unknown defeaters can have on 
knowledge. We’ll notice that in every case discussed so far—the original, alien, 
and printer cases—Smith is ignorant of the further alternatives that are raised. In 
some cases, those ‘defeaters’ undermine his knowledge (e.g. the printer case), but 
in others not (the original and alien cases). Yet, in each case the evidence that Smith 
has for believing the plane will land in Chicago is the same. Smith is unaware of 
any differences, of course, which raises two concerns: First, why is his evidence 
not sufficient for knowledge in Printer-Airport and, second, doesn’t this imply that 
he is just lucky in Original-Airport? 
 The crucial difference between these cases has to do with Smith’s 
background evidence. For Alien-Airport, Smith already has background 
information that will override the proposed alternative, but for Printer-Airport he 
does not. So, although he is unaware of the alternative possibilities, it is the 
information that he possesses that determines whether he does in fact know. In 
the next section, we’ll explore extensions of each case to look at this issue more in 
depth and to provide support for concluding that the knowledge-denial (HIGH) 
in the original cases rests on a mistake. 
§2.5: Rebutting and Conceding. 
 The two cases discussed in the previous section will act as the basis for 




strengthen that conclusion, I propose two further tests that will help determine 
whether a mistake has occurred. The main idea is that we consider an extended 
case in which Smith offers a rebuttal to Mary and John’s knowledge denial that 
does not rest upon Smith acquiring any more evidence than he already has. Smith 
can defend his knowledge claim against Mary and John by turning to his 
background evidence. Importantly, this test is simply a reflection of the way that 
we ordinarily reason when an assertion is made, and reasons are offered to counter 




Mary: I heard you say that you know the plane will land in Chicago, but 
did you consider that aliens might have attacked Chicago and so prevent 
the plane from landing there. Your itinerary can’t rule that out. 
 
Smith: That seems far-fetched. What gives you the idea it might happen? 
 
Mary: Alien attacks are possible and that is something we should be careful 
not to ignore. 
 
Smith: If you don’t have any reason to think an alien attack will happen, 
we don’t have any reason to conclude the itinerary is not reliable. So, I have 
no reason to question the reliability of the itinerary and will confidently 
restate I know the plane will land in Chicago. 
 
Smith’s response to Mary seems appropriate. Simply by pointing out the mistake 
in her reasoning, and by explaining why it’s still reasonable for him to believe the 
itinerary is reliable, he has upset her attempt to show that he lacks knowledge. In 




position. This is significant because further evidence would alter the case in a way 
that unfairly biases it towards invariantism by adding to Smith’s evidence.  
For instance, if Smith checked a few news outlets or called a friend in 
Chicago to confirm there was no attack, his epistemic position would be stronger 
than in the original case. But since the original cases are importantly based on 
Smith having the same epistemic position, the contextualist could simply point out 
that there was a change which implies the rebuttal case is irrelevant.  So, it is 





For Alien-Airport, Smith’s background information is the primary reason 
that he avoids losing knowledge. However, a subject need not always possess 
background evidence to prevent a defeater from undermining knowledge.42 Keith 
Lehrer and Thomas Paxson’s Grabit-Case is one example.43 In that case, Mrs. Black 
witnessed her student, Tom Grabit, while he was stealing a book. Elsewhere, 
Tom’s mentally ill mother heard about this and stated that Tom’s identical twin 
brother, who doesn’t exist, committed the crime. Of course, Mrs. Black is unaware 
of this and she lacks any background evidence to address the defeater; for instance, 
that Tom’s mother has mental health issues or that Tom has mentioned being an 
only child on several occasions. Intuitively, however, she knows it was Tom who 
stole the book. But it seems that she would believe Mrs. Grabit’s claim if she 
became aware of it and didn’t know about her mental health.  In effect, Mrs. Black 
is lucky to have avoided this misleading defeater. 
                                                             
42 Thanks to Bruce Russell for making this point and bringing the Grabit-Case to my attention. 
 




For this sort of case, Mylan Engel Jr’s distinction between evidential and 
veritic luck is helpful.44 Evidential luck occurs when there is some amount of ‘luck’ 
that occurred in one’s acquisition of good evidence and perhaps, as we see with 
Mrs. Black, their avoidance of bad evidence. This luck does not undermine 
knowledge, however, because, lucky or not, that evidence reliably distinguishes 
between p and not-p.45 In the case of Mrs. Black, her first-hand experience of seeing 
him steal the book, in conjunction with any background evidence, is reliable.  
On the other hand, veritic luck occurs when one’s evidence doesn’t reliably 
distinguish between something being true and its being false. Turning to an 
extended, rebuttal-version of Printer-Airport, we can see that the same sort of 
response given in Alien-Rebuttal would not be successful. Unlike Smith’s response 
in Alien-Reubttal, he doesn’t have any evidence to defeat the alternative 
possibility discussed by Mary. Since he lacks further supporting evidence, he has 
little recourse but to straightforwardly deny that Mary’s evidence for the printer 
issue is relevant or that it is enough to suggest the itinerary is not reliable: 
 
 
                                                             
44 Engel Jr. (1992) 
 
45 Perhaps, someone can get too lucky in terms of having the right evidence. Even so, some amount of 
evidential luck is permissible. And, more to the point, whatever issue this raises for my view, it would seem 
to raise the same issue for contextualism as well. So, I don’t see a need to fully address this here. 
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that this essentially comes down to the reliability of one’s environment. 
Tom’s mother isn’t enough to upset that reliability because it is a single misleading defeater that is not even 
salient to Mrs. Black. However, if Mrs. Black lived in an environment with an extraordinarily high number 
of twins, it greatly raises the possibility that Tom does have a twin. In that case, it might be enough to upset 






Mary: I heard you say that you know the plane will land in Chicago, but 
did you know that the airline has had issues with their printer software over 
the past few weeks? Are you sure that your itinerary doesn’t have an error? 
 
Smith: That seems far-fetched. What gives you the idea that might happen? 
 
Mary: I heard it on the news this morning and there is also an article in the 
New York Times. As far as I know, the airline has yet to say it has been 
fixed. 
 
Smith: I don’t think that gives us any reason to worry the itinerary is not 
reliable. So, I don’t see any reason to conclude that I don’t know the plane 
will land in Chicago. 
 
In this instance, Smith’s response is false. The issue with the printers is a good 
reason to conclude that Smith’s itinerary is not reliable. So, it does not provide 
good evidence that the plane will land in Chicago because the probability that the 
itinerary contains a mistake is too high.46 As a result, the itinerary doesn’t stand as 
a reliable piece of evidence that will support Smith’s claim to know the plane will 
land in Chicago.  
Smith’s true belief is veritically lucky in this case because his true belief is 
not the result of having good evidence, but because he just happened to ‘get it 
right’—he’s just lucky that his itinerary is correct despite the fact that itineraries in 
general are unreliable. Based on this bad evidence, it is also likely that his belief 
could have turned out false. Of course, Smith could offer further evidence to 
reestablish his claim to know. But that supports the general point—the issue with 
                                                             
46 The use of ‘good evidence’ here is admittedly vague, but as we will see, my argument does not rest on a 
precise definition. Rather, it is driven by our intuitive assessments of these cases and those we will discuss 




the printer software undermines the reliability of the itinerary and so further 
evidence is required. And this is true whether we are discussing Smith’s claim to 
know or Mary and John’s denial. 
This last point underlies a critical aspect of the printer case—whether the 
issue is salient to Mary or Smith is irrelevant to whether he knows the plane will 
land in Chicago. The fact of the matter is that he doesn’t know because his evidence 
is not reliable, and it would still be unreliable even if he and Mary were entirely 
unaware of the printer issues. The reason is that the issue with the printer creates an 
environment in which itineraries are not a reliable source of evidence and it 
doesn’t get to stand as good evidence simply because the problem is not salient. 
I’ll return to this point in chapter 3. 
However, salience can affect a subject in other ways. For example, let’s say 
that Mary reads a newspaper headline about printer issues with the airline, but 
the newspaper has incorrectly reported the problem to be with JetBlue when the 
issue is affecting Southwest. Mary believes the report and she has good, although 
misleading, evidence to justify her belief. Smith is unaware of this. However, were 
Mary to make this issue salient to him, he would lack sufficient evidence to 




original belief because he lacks any evidence to suggest that the newspaper has 
made such an error.47  
To be sure, there is evidence that would defeat the false news report—i.e. 
‘defeat the defeater’—but Smith is not aware of this either. So, despite the fact the 
news report is false, he would no longer know that the plane will land Chicago if 
the news report were salient to him. However, despite his lack of evidence to 
counter Mary’s misleading evidence, he knows because his evidence is in fact 
reliable.48 This seems correct even though he is in some sense lucky to have 
avoided Mary’s misleading evidence; i.e. he is evidentially lucky.  
 So, when rebutting the alien possibility, Smith’s knowledge claim is true, 
but when rebutting the printer issue, it is false. What happens if Mary concedes to 
Smith? For instance, what if she responds: “I see what you’re saying Smith. I guess 
you do know the plane will land in Chicago.” Applied to both cases, the obvious 
answer is that her claim is true in the alien case, but false in the printer case. Here 
is a ‘concession’ version of the latter: 
Printer-Concession: 
 
Mary: I heard you say that you know the plane will land in Chicago, but 
did you know that the airline has had issues with their printer software over 
the past few weeks? Are you sure that your itinerary doesn’t have an error? 
 
                                                             
47 I use the term ‘defeater’ here with some qualification. It seems a defeater in the sense that Smith would 
be justified to believe that the news report is true and unjustified to believe otherwise were the news report 
salient to him. So, the sense in which it is a defeater is subjective because this requirement ‘kicks in’ only 
when the issue is salient to the subject. However, it is not a defeater in an objective sense. In the objective 
sense, salience is irrelevant to whether the defeater must be addressed to have knowledge. An example of 
this occurs in the printer case.  




Smith: That seems far-fetched. What gives you the idea that might happen? 
 
Mary: I heard it on the news this morning and there is an article in the New 
York Times. The airline has yet to say it has been fixed. 
 
Smith: I don’t think that gives us any reason to worry that the itinerary is 
not reliable, and I will confidently restate I know the plane will land in 
Chicago. 
 
Mary: That’s a good point -- maybe the printer issue has been fixed. I guess 
you do know that the plane will land in Chicago. 
 
The evidence is against Smith in this case, but Mary has conceded to him anyway 
and that seems incorrect. Notice that she attempts to justify the response with an 
unsubstantiated claim—maybe the printer issue has been fixed. Interestingly, this 
is the same issue that arises in the alien case since she suggests an alternative 
possibility for which she has little to no evidence. On the other hand, she has very 
good reason to think that the printer issue has not been fixed. So, again, if Mary 
concedes in the Alien case, her concession seems appropriate and true, but when 
doing so in the printer case it is false.49 
§2.6 Applying Rebuttal and Concession to the Original Case 
 In the previous section, we discussed two types of cases—one in which 
Smith offers a rebuttal to Mary and John and a second in which Mary concedes to 
Smith’s rebuttal. Below is a table to organize our thinking on these cases so far. 
Each ‘T’ and ‘F’ refers to whether the knowledge claim/denial in the given case is 
intuitively true or false. For example, there is a ‘T’ in the Alien-Airport/Low box 
                                                             
49 This example points to an underlying issue raised by Printer-Concession—whether Mary raises the 
possibility is irrelevant to whether Smith knows. In other words, if there is a significant possibility that the 




below and an ‘F’ in Alien-Airport/High. In the first case, Smith claimed to know 
the plane will land in Chicago and that claim is intuitively true. In Alien-




Table 2: Comparison of Alien-Airport and Printer-Airport 
 LOW REBUTTAL CONCESSION HIGH 
Alien-
Airport T T T F  
Printer-
Airport F F F T  
 
Table 2 covers the four cases we have discussed so far in this chapter. LOW and 
HIGH are Smith’s original claim to know C and Mary and John’s denial, 
respectively. For Alien-Airport, it seems correct to say that Smith knows C even 
though Mary and John raise the possibility of an alien attack and Smith hasn’t yet 
addressed this issue. However, in Printer-Airport it seems correct to say that he 
doesn’t know C. The second column, Rebuttal, indicates whether it would be 
correct to say Smith knows that C after he offers a rebuttal to Mary and John’s 
denial that he knows. For Alien-Airport, it seems correct to say that he knows there 




have any good reason to believe A is sufficient to undercut their claim. That is not 
the case in Printer-Airport. If Smith stubbornly claims to know, that claim is false. 
Putting this altogether, we get the following general point: when an 
attributor lacks good reason to deny that subject knows, the subject’s rebuttal 
successfully defends against the attributor’s denial—assuming he has background 
reasons to support the rebuttal—and the attributor’s concession that the subject 
does know (or ‘probably knows’) is correct. I take these points to be a 
commonplace since we typically reject a claim when the person is unable to 
provide sufficient reason to accept it.  
On the other hand, when the attributor has good reason for the denial, the 
type of responses given in Rebuttal and Concession don’t work. Again, this seems 
to follow the ordinary way in which we reason on a daily basis. When good 
reasons are offered to suggest that a subject’s evidence is unreliable, we typically 
reject the subject’s claim to know unless better reasons are offered in support of 
their belief. Smith’s response does not work in Printer-Rebuttal because the issues 
with the printer, which Mary points out, imply that his evidence is not reliable. To 
regain knowledge, Smith needs further evidence to support his belief that the 
plane will land in Chicago or that the itinerary is reliable. 
Turning to the original case, the same ideas apply. If we find Smith’s 
rebuttal and Mary’s concession for the original case to be appropriate, we have 
good reason to think that this is because Mary’s denial rests on a mistake. (And if 




and it rests on a mistake.) These results alone won’t get us all the way to 
concluding a mistake occurs, of course. That is an issue we’ll need to address later. 
But to begin, we will analyze the original Airport case in the same way that we 
have analyzed these modified versions. Here is the original case once more: 
Airport: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating taking a 
certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight has a 
layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if anyone knows whether 
the flight makes any stops. Another passenger, Smith, replies, “I do. I just 
looked at my flight itinerary and there is a stop in Chicago." It turns out that 
Mary and John have a very important business contact they have to meet at 
the Chicago airport. Mary says [to John], “How reliable is that itinerary, 
anyway? It could contain a misprint. They could have changed the schedule 
since it was printed, etc.," Mary and John agree that Smith doesn’t really 
know that the plane will stop in Chicago on the basis of the itinerary. They 
decide to check with the airline.50 
 
As we see in the original case, the issue that Mary and John raise is the possibility 
the flight changed or the itinerary itself contains an error, either of which implies 
the itinerary is unreliable. Based on these considerations, they deny that Smith 
knows the plane will land in Chicago and that seems like a reasonable and 
appropriate claim for them to make. As discussed earlier and in chapter 1, I accept 
the denial is appropriate. The main issue is whether the denial—i.e. HIGH—is true.  
To assess whether HIGH in the original case is true, it will be instructive to 
see how the alternative possibility that Mary and John raise in the original case 
turns out when looking at the rebuttal and concession cases. Here is a version of 
the original case with a dialogue similar to the other rebuttal examples: 
                                                             







Mary: I heard you say that you know the plane will land in Chicago, but 
did you consider the possibility that the itinerary contains an error, or the 
flight plan was changed? 
 
Smith: No, I didn’t – did you hear something? 
 
Mary: Not specifically, but it’s possible that something has happened. 
Flight plans do change from time to time, among other mistakes, and so I 
don’t think you can conclude that you know without ruling out that 
possibility. 
 
Smith: Of course, it is a possibility and I agree that such things happen, but 
as far as I know they are quite rare. And since you don’t have any reason to 
think that it has actually happened to this flight, why do I need to prove 
that it won’t or hasn’t? It’s not typical and aside from the mere possibility, 
I have good reason to think the itinerary is reliable. So, it seems safe to say 
that I know the plane will land in Chicago.51 
 
Smith’s rebuttal here seems on point. He’s offered good reason to reject Mary’s 
claim by showing that she lacks support for the possibility that an error of some 
kind has occurred. I’ll say a bit more about this shortly, but for the moment we’ll 
assume Smith successfully defends his knowledge claim in this dialogue. 
 Moving to the second case, Mary concludes the discussion by conceding the 
Smith does know: 
Original-Concession: 
Mary: That’s a good point—I don’t have a reason to think something has 
happened. I guess you do know it will land in Chicago. 
 
                                                             
51 If we took Smith’s response a bit further, he might point out that there are an infinite number of 
possibilities of which he has no reason to believe actually obtain. Without some reason to think that one 




For my part, Mary’s concession seems appropriate, but I can see how someone 
might think her statement, “I guess you do know” is forced. Perhaps, that is 
because attributing knowledge in this instance isn’t typical or because Mary is 
hedging somewhat. Even so, this is no problem for the invariantist, in part, 
because Mary’s ‘hedging attribution’ isn’t necessary. What matters is that it is 
reasonable for her to not deny Smith knows even if she doesn’t attribute 
knowledge to him. Consider two other responses that seem reasonable for Mary: 
• You’re probably right the plane will land in Chicago, but I’m a bit anxious 
and so I just want to double-check. 
 
• I see your point and I guess I don’t have much reason to think some error 
or problem has occurred. However, I’d like to go ask the attendant anyway 
just to make sure. 
 
Again, these responses seem appropriate and the implicit knowledge claims 
(“You’re probably right”) seem true. Mary might refrain from attributing 
knowledge for any number of reasons and certainly we can understand that she 
and John are being cautious given their situation. Yet, being cautious doesn’t say 
anything about whether LOW is true or false.  
If attributing knowledge to Smith or, at least, not denying he knows seems 
appropriate, then the idea that her original denial is true is called into question. It 
is also reasonable to think we are just following Mary’s reasoning rather than 
tracking variable truth-conditions for ‘know’. When Mary reasons that Smith 




probably does) that also seems appropriate.52 Whether or not those claims are true 
is a separate question and we should be wary of answering based on 
appropriateness alone.  
So, we have one case in which Mary and John deny Smith knows and 
another in which they do not. Unless the contextualist can show that Mary’s 
concession is mistaken, he will have to account for the difference between HIGH 
and her concession by arguing there has been a change in context. Such a move 
should raise an eyebrow since there has been no change in the practical issues and 
no further evidence or alternatives have been introduced. Smith has only pointed 
out that they lack reason(s) to believe the flight plan has changed and that was 
sufficient to override it. In short, arguing that the context has changed looks like 
an ad hoc move to avoid the problem at hand. So, I think it’s safe to say that Mary’s 
concession is reasonable and appropriate. 
§2.7 The Error in Airport-Original 
 Assuming that our discussion of Original-Rebuttal and Concession is 
correct, we can start filling out the table below with Airport-Original added into 
the mix. In this case, Smith’s original attribution (LOW) seems correct. His claim 
to know also seems true when offering a rebuttal to Mary and John. Finally, it 
                                                             
52 The fact both responses seem appropriate raises a further issue for contextualism—people tend to defer 
to the speaker in these cases which is sometimes referred to as the ‘agreement bias’. In a series of 
experiments, John Turri (2017) showed that people tend to agree with the speaker’s claims. So, whether 
Mary and John attribute or deny knowledge, people tend to agree with whatever they claim. This makes 
sense because most are not actively ready to reject a claim unless something ‘sticks out’ as it does in the 




seems true when Mary concedes to Smith—even if she hedges somewhat in doing 
so. So, we have the following table, with the most important box still missing an 
answer: 
Table 3: Comparing each of the three airport cases 
  
LOW REBUTTAL CONCESSION HIGH 
Airport-
Alien 
T T T F 
Airport-
Printer F F F T 
Airport-
Original 
T T T ? 
 
Immediately, we can see that there is more similarity between Airport-Alien and 
Airport-Original. In both cases, Smith knows when the possibility is not salient, 
but also when he stands-in to rebut the possibility suggested by Mary and John. 
To be sure, some important similarities are shown in the chart above, but these 
similarities are not the crucial. Rather, my argument is that the best explanation of 
all cases considered is that HIGH in the original case is false because Mary and 
John’s claim rests on the same type of mistake that occurred in the alien case.  
Notice that Mary lacks good reason to support the suggested alternative in 
both the alien case and the original case. In both cases, her claim is based on it 
being possible, but she provided no evidence to suggest it was at all likely. Because 
she lacks good reason to support her claim, we have good reason to think the 
rebuttal will work and the concession will seem appropriate which is what we find 




previous section. The best explanation of these results is that HIGH in the original 
case is false. 
How might the contextualist respond? First, one might balk at concluding 
the original case is like the alien case because the possibility discussed in the latter 
is somewhat ridiculous. Alien attacks don’t happen, but flight plans do sometimes 
change, and so it is safe to say that flight plan errors are much more likely than 
alien attacks. If that is the case, how can it be helpful to compare them?  
Focusing on the difference in probability misses the point of the argument. 
I have not argued, for instance, that the probabilities in the cases are similar, 
therefore we should conclude they are alike in other respects. Rather, I have 
argued that there is a similarity in the type of mistake(s) that occurs in alien case 
which also appears to have occurred in the original case; namely, the false belief 
that an alternative possibility is probable.  This similarity in type is shown via the 
rebuttal and concession cases. Because of those similarities and because the high-
stakes knowledge denial is false in the alien case, we have reason to conclude 
HIGH is false in the original case. So, if one wishes to attack this claim, they must 
address the rebuttal and concession cases.  
Even if it is argued the probabilities are too different, contextualists must 
explain why this difference is enough to suggest that HIGH is not false and do so 
by offering some account of what sort of probabilities are high enough to matter. 
This leads us to our second point since it could also be argued that Mary and John 




those reasons need to be identified since merely asserting they have good enough 
reason to deny Smith knows is not sufficient.53 For instance, imagine that Mary 
replies with something like the following: 
Mary: I’m not sure that this flight plan was changed, but I did hear recently 
that this airline is notorious for changing flight plans at the last moment. 
 
If Mary replied in this way, then Smith’s rebuttal would be far less convincing, 
and HIGH would seem to have the upper hand. Given that she has offered some 
reason to believe the itinerary has an error, we also have some reason to conclude 
Smith’s initial claim to know (LOW) is false. So, when Mary and John have good 
reason to support their claim, then we’ve just created another scenario similar to 
Airport-Printer. When the attributor lacks good reason, and we are careful to 
analyze a bit beyond our initial reaction, we end up with an outcome similar to 
Airport-Alien. 
 But perhaps this is too hasty—do Mary and John actually need to support 
their claim with further reason? Isn’t the mere suggestion of the possibility 
enough? For example, let’s consider a version of the case from Jessica Brown: 
Mary: …The itinerary might be mistaken; perhaps there’s been a late 
change of schedule. We better check. 
 
John: Well, it’s not very likely that the itinerary’s incorrect. We’ve certainly 
no reason to think there’s been a late change. How often have you come 
across an incorrect itinerary? Of course, the plane’s going to Chicago. 
 
                                                             
53 I qualify this claim to distinguish it from their having good reasons to seek further evidence. As discussed 
earlier, this is perfectly acceptable response for practical purposes. However, the implication of this 





Mary: OK, I know it’s unlikely that the itinerary’s wrong. I believe the 
plane’s going to Chicago too. But that’s not the point. Just imagine what 
would happen if we took the flight and it doesn’t stop at Chicago. We’d 
miss the meeting. [Smith] can’t rule out the possibility of an itinerary error 
[and so he doesn’t] know the plane will stop. [We better go and check.]54 
 
In this version of the case Mary offers no further reason(s) to support the 
possibility of an error. However, she maintains that the mere possibility alone is 
sufficient to support the claim that Smith doesn’t know. If Mary’s claim is true, 
then my view is called into question because Mary doesn’t seem to require any 
further reason to support the possibility the itinerary has an error.  
Is this a convincing case? I think not for at least two reasons. First, we 
should compare this case to the case in which Mary concedes (“You’re probably 
right”), but states that she would like to double-check anyway. For my part, that 
is a much more intuitive response than stubbornly holding that Smith doesn’t 
know. It is quite appropriate for Mary to remain concerned and desire to double-
check. However, an individual’s desire to double-check and be more secure in 
their thinking does not have broader implications about the truth of attributing or 
denying knowledge of another individual.  
Second, in ordinary circumstances it is disingenuous for someone to 
acknowledge that an alternative possibility is unlikely and yet take this unlikely 
alternative to provide sufficient reason to reject a possibility for which we have 
good reason to believe that it is true. In ordinary contexts, at least, mere 
                                                             
54 Brown (2005), 147. I’ve slightly modified the end, so it is applicable here. Also, note that Brown offers 




possibilities don’t destroy knowledge even if they might grab our attention at first 
as Mary’s suggestion may have done in the original Airport case. Knowledge is 
truly affected when there are possibilities that we have good reason to think are 
likely to occur. This seems to be the way that people ordinarily reason and draw 
conclusions about what they or someone else knows. If this is correct, then we have 




 In this chapter, I have argued that the debate between contextualism and 
invariantism comes down to three different intuitions: an intuition that S knows 
p, an intuition that S doesn’t know p, and an intuition that the first two claims 
contradict. To defend their view, contextualists must show that the third intuition 
is false because it rests on a mistake. At this point, the prospects for this are weak. 
On the other hand, the invariantist must show that one of the first two claims rests 
on a mistake. I have argued that the high-stakes claims in the original Bank and 
Airport cases do rest on a mistake because the alternative possibility offered lacks 
sufficient support to suggest that the subject’s original evidence is unreliable. 
 Nevertheless, the contextualist still has some resources to defend their 
view. For example, they might argue that changes in what is at stake is the primary 
issue ‘motivating’ our intuition to deny in the high-stakes cases. This would 




next chapter, I will address the issue of changing stakes in addition to returning to 









In Chapter 2, I argued that Mary and John’s knowledge denial in Cohen’s 
airport case rests on a mistaken belief. Since the denial rests on a mistake, we have 
good reason to conclude that Mary and John’s denial is false. Yet, even if the denial 
rests on a mistaken belief, the contexualist can reply that an increase in what is at 
stake directly motivates Mary and John’s denial (and our intuition to accept the 
denial).55 If a mere change in stakes motivates the denial, then we might have some 
evidence for contextualism. In this chapter, I examine the possibility that stakes 
motivate our intuitions. My aim is to show that there is little reason to conclude an 
increase in what is at stake affects the truth-value of a knowledge claim.  
To support this conclusion, I first look at a set of cases from Jonathan 
Schaffer who offers a modified set of the original bank cases, but without the bias 
of having a subject or attributor claim to know/not know. Schaffer’s cases suggest 
that the introduction of a salient alternative (e.g., that the itinerary is mistaken), 
rather than a change in what is at stake, is what prompts a change in intuition. This 
might seem to imply that mere salience is enough to undermine a knowledge claim 
and to be sure, salience can affect whether a subject has knowledge. However, the 
                                                             
55 An increase in stakes may affect claims to know and intuitions about such claims in ways that are not 
controversial. For example, an increase in stakes may result in losing confidence that one’s belief is correct. 
(This is why DeRose argues for the controversial claim that the subjects in his cases do not lose confidence. 
For more on this see Bach, 2005.) Of interest for us, is whether stakes may directly affect our intuitions by 
which I mean that no other factor acts as an intermediary (e.g. loss of confidence/loss of belief that p is 





mere fact that an alternative is salient is not enough. As I argued in chapter 2, the 
alternative in question must provide good reasons to call into the question the 
reliability of one’s evidence.56 On this view salience is irrelevant and only the 
probability of not-p determines whether it must be ruled out to know that p.57 So, 
while Schaffer’s general point about the irrelevance of stakes is correct, he did not 
see the further implication about the type of alternative that is required to 
undermine knowledge. 
To conclude this chapter, I will discuss two possible responses by the 
contextualist. The first is that salience will sometimes determine if an alternative 
must be ruled out and the second is that a sufficiently high change in stakes will 
alter the truth-conditions for ‘know’. I argue that neither response is sufficient. 
§3.1 Schaffer’s Unbiased Minimal Pairs: It’s Not About the Stakes 
In his article “The Irrelevance of the Subject”, Jonathan Schaffer argues that 
stakes are not the motivating factor behind our intuitions. His argument begins by 
criticizing the original bank cases for being ‘biased pairs’ because they contain 
multiple important differences (change in belief, change in evidence, etc.).58 As a 
                                                             
56 This is, of course, just one way the justification for some proposition can be defeated. It can also be 
undermined if there is more evidence for not-p. However, we won’t discuss that style of defeater here. See 
Casullo (2003) Chapter 3 for discussion on these types of defeaters. 
 
57 There are instances in which the subject believes that an alternative represents a good defeater when it 
in fact does not. But these cases result from a mistake in reasoning by the subject, and so they are not 
relevant to our discussion. 
 
58 Schaffer is specifically arguing against the Subject-Sensitive Invariantism of Jason Stanley and John 





result, it is not clear which difference motivates the shift from intuiting that Smith 
knows to intuiting that he does not.59 Some of these differences lead to problems 
for first-person cases that we discussed in Chapter 1 since a change in belief, for 
example, can account for the difference in our intuition without any need for the 
further contextualist explanation. This difference isn’t present in third-person 
cases. However, there are two additional differences that become problematic 
even for third-person cases.  
In the original Airport cases, for instance, the high stakes context includes 
at least two major differences from the low stakes context. The first difference is 
that Mary offers an alternative possibility in which the itinerary is not reliable. 
Since this alternative is not salient to Smith (or us) when looking solely at Smith’s 
context, it is quite possible that the salient alternative is the motivating factor 
behind accepting Mary’s denial.60 This suggests that, if the alternative is also 
salient in Smith’s context, we might be prone to denying that he knows. To test 
this, we will have to look at a set of cases in which the alternative is present in both 
and a set of cases in which it is salient in neither. The second difference is the 
explicit change in what is at stake. For Smith there is very little at stake, but for 
Mary and John there is a lot at stake, and it is possible that a change in what is at 
                                                             
59 As I understand the contextualist view, this isn’t so much a ‘change in intuition’, but two entirely distinct 
intuitions given that we are actually considering two different propositions.  
 
60 That is not to say they are good reasons. As I argued in the previous chapter, Mary and John’s denial that 





stake prompts a shift in our intuitions because we inherently take it that better 
evidence is required when more is at stake.  
The support that contextualism receives from these cases depends greatly 
on which difference motivates the change in intuition. If the change is the result of 
salient alternatives, the invariantist can plausibly argue that the epistemic position 
of Smith—or, at least, our evaluation of it—has changed. However, contextualism 
is favored if the change is the result of an increase in what is at stake. 
To avoid these issues and get a helpful assessment of what is motivating 
our intuitions, Jonathan Schaffer has modified the original cases to produce sets of 
“unbiased minimal pairs.” They are unbiased in the sense that the subject and/or 
attributor do not make claims about knowing or not knowing. Instead, whether 
the subject seems to know is left entirely up to the reader.61 And they are minimal 
in the sense that there is only a single difference between each case.62 They only 
differ in terms of what is at stake. So, as mentioned above, there will not be a 
difference in terms of salient alternatives. In each set, the alternative will be salient 
in both or salient in neither. 
                                                             
61 Because Schaffer takes out any aspect of the subject attributing or denying knowledge to himself, these 
cases are also not first-person cases. So, they do not run into the same issues that we discussed in regard 
to DeRose’s original bank cases in Chapter 1. 
 





Schaffer first offers a set of cases in which no additional possibility has been 
made salient in either case (e.g. the bank has changed its hours), but there is a 
difference in what is a stake: 
NOT-SALIENT-LOW: On Friday afternoon, Sam is driving past the bank 
with his paycheck in his pocket. The lines are long. Sam would prefer to 
deposit his check before Monday, but he has no pressing need to deposit 
the check. He has little at stake. Sam remembers that the bank was open last 
Saturday, so he figures that the bank will be open this Saturday. He is right 
– the bank will be open. So, does Sam know that the bank will be open this 
Saturday? 
 
NOT-SALIENT-HIGH: On Friday afternoon, Sam is driving past the bank 
with his paycheck in his pocket. The lines are long. Sam would prefer to 
deposit his check before Monday, and indeed he has pressing financial 
obligations that require a deposit before Monday. His entire financial future 
is at stake. Sam remembers that the bank was open last Saturday, so he 
figures that the bank will be open this Saturday. He is right – the bank will 
be open. So, does Sam know that the bank will be open this Saturday?63    
 
Schaffer intuits that Sam knows in both cases, and I would say the same. There is 
the further question of whether Sam would be rational to act on this knowledge 
and those issues will be addressed in Chapter 4.64 Setting that aside for now, the 
                                                             
63 Ibid. Though my intuition is that Sam knows in both cases, posing the question “Does he know?” has 
something of an inherent skeptical effect. I would imagine that is because questioning whether someone 
knows is often asked with an element of skepticism and especially in cases in which the person has already 
stated their reasons for belief. We don’t usually follow up a claim with “Do you know that such and such is 
the case?” unless we are challenging the claim in some sense (e.g. seeking for the evidence/reasons to be 
established, reiterated or supported, etc.). It seems to me that this might raise some methodological issues 
regarding the way in which surveys are conducted which purport to test our intuitions about knowledge 
attributions. See Turri 2016 for another discussion of possible methodological issues with these examples. 
 
64 In short, the argument is as follows. Some object that, if you know p, then it is rational to act on p. I argue 
in Chapter 4 that this claim is false. For one, it fails to recognize that you also know the bank is open now 
and the task will be completed if you don’t wait. What you don’t know is whether waiting till the next day 
will be successful—there are, in fact, a vast number of other factors than just the bank being open which 
take part in determining whether you’ll be successful if you wait till the next day. Since the added benefit 





main question here is whether a change in stakes—specifically, an increase in what 
is at stake—motivates our intuition to conclude that Sam doesn’t know. If a mere 
difference in stakes directly motivates a change in intuition, we would expect to 
intuit that Sam doesn’t know the bank will be open. At least as far as Schaffer and 
I are concerned, that intuition does not follow from a mere increase in stakes which 
suggests that stakes don’t have the proposed effect. Without the possibility Sam is 
wrong, we don’t think it is reasonable to conclude he doesn’t know.  
On the other hand, what if we compare the intuitive responses to a set of 
cases in which the possibility of error is salient? Here again Schaffer provides two 
minimal and unbiased cases in which the only difference is in terms of what is at 
stake for each subject. In contrast to the original bank cases and the two cases just 
discussed, both include a salient alternative: 
SALIENT-LOW: On Friday afternoon, Sam is driving past the bank with 
his paycheck in his pocket. The lines are long. Sam would prefer to deposit 
his check before Monday, but he has no pressing need to deposit the check. 
He has little at stake. Sam remembers that the bank was open last Saturday, 
so he figures that the bank will be open this Saturday. He is right – the bank 
will be open. But banks do change their hours, and Sam has not looked into 
this. So, does Sam know that the bank will be open this Saturday? 
 
SALIENT-HIGH: On Friday afternoon, Sam is driving past the bank with 
his paycheck in his pocket. The lines are long. Sam would prefer to deposit 
his check before Monday, and indeed he has pressing financial obligations 
that require a deposit before Monday. His entire financial future is at stake. 
Sam remembers that the bank was open last Saturday, so he figures that the 
bank will be open this Saturday. He is right – the bank will be open. But 
banks do change their hours, and Sam has not looked into this. So, does 
Sam know that the bank will be open this Saturday?65   
  
                                                             




The second set of cases are word-for-word the same as the first set except for the 
brief addition of “But banks do change their hours, and Sam has not looked into 
this.” Again, you’ll also notice that Sam doesn’t make any claims about whether 
he knows since that would only serve to confuse what is motivating our intuition. 
By leaving out such claims, we avoid any ‘bias’ between the cases. 
Schaffer intuits that Sam does not know in either of the salient cases. For 
these cases, my intuition differs from Schaffer as it seems to me that Sam still 
knows in both cases. The reason is that the salient alternative offered rests on the 
same sort of mistake as the alternative Mary proposes in the Airport case. For that 
case, I argued the alternatives discussed in the high-stakes scenario fail to stand 
up to scrutiny and this is why, rationally speaking, they can be ignored. Mary 
offers an alternative possibility that she takes to undermine Smith’s evidence (i.e. 
the itinerary). However, her alternative comes with no supporting evidence to 
suggest that the issues she has mentioned are common or that such an error has 
occurred.  
In the same way, the alternative suggested in the Bank case—that banks 
sometimes change their hours—also rests on a mistake. To be sure, banks most 
likely change their hours from time to time, but we’ve been given no reason to 
think the bank has changed its hours in this instance or that this bank (or banks in 
general) changes its hours often enough to raise concern. 
Even though I intuit differently than Schaffer, we agree in the most relevant 




stakes cases. For these cases to support contextualism, we should intuit differently 
in at least one set of the cases; that is, we should intuit Sam knows when the stakes 
are low, but not when the stakes are high. The fact we don’t suggests that what is 
at stake is not the motivating force behind our intuition to attribute or deny 
knowledge or agree that an attribution or denial is true. So, the contextualist’s 
prediction that we will is questionable at best. 
The contextualist might argue that Schaffer’s intuitions as well as my own 
are something of an anomaly but looking at some recent studies we don’t seem to 
be alone. In these studies, a change in what is at stake doesn’t appear to lead to a 
change in people’s intuitions regarding what a subject knows. Schaffer offers 
support for this in his own study with Wesley Buckwalter.66 Additional work from 
Adam Feltz and Chris Zarpentine indicates that individuals are not “sensitive to 
the practical facts of a subject’s situation.”67 To be fair, a few studies seem to 
counter these conclusions.68 So, I won’t hang my hat on the studies that support 
                                                             
66 Buckwalter and Schaffer (2015). Also see Buckwalter (2010) and Turri (2016). In the 2015, Buckwalter and 
Schaffer conclude that stakes do not motivate denials, but salience does. I agree that salience can have an 
effect. However, as I will discuss later, these examples (and the corresponding empirical studies) fail to 
recognize that salience is often irrelevant. It isn’t mere salience that motivates a knowledge denial. Rather, 
it is a salient possibility that is accepted by the ‘intuiter’ as sufficiently likely. In example cases (e.g. the Alien 
case from Chapter 2), in which the salient possibility is sufficiently unlikely, the intuition is to maintain that 
the person knows. 
 
67 Feltz and Zarpentine (2010). 
 
68 See Pinillos (2011) and Sripada and Stanley (2012). Buckwalter and Schaffer (2015) offers a successful 
counter to both, in my opinion. One particular argument from Buckwalter and Schaffer is of interest. In one 
of their studies, they offered participants cases that switched out uses of ‘know’ for related terms such as 
‘belief’ or ‘confidence’ and so on. Such changes seemed to have no effect on the results which suggests that 
knowledge is not of concern for the participants, but instead the more practical issue of what the subject 





the invariantist position. The point, however, is that neither can the contextualists 
hang their hat on the claim that the tendency to attribute or deny knowledge in 
ordinary situations is influenced by changes in what is at stake since there is good 
evidence to the contrary.  
To sum up, the contextualist’s initial reports are unreliable because they rest 
on cases that contain multiple differences as well as claims which are biased 
toward the contextualist position. Once the issues in these cases have been 
removed, the intuitive responses don’t appear to support the contextualist’s view.  
§3.2 Salient Alternatives and Attributors 
 Schaffer’s revised cases suggest that only when there is a salient alternative 
to the original claim does a change in intuition result. (Also, recall that some 
empirical studies provide support to this view.) Underlying this argument, we’ll 
find a further important detail—whether the alternative is salient to the attributor 
is largely irrelevant to what we intuit. 
One point in favor of this is that the attributor’s claim is sometimes counter-
intuitive even though an alternative has been raised. We know this, for example, 
from the alien example in Chapter 2. Though Mary and John suggest the 
possibility of an alien attack, it doesn’t motivate us to agree with Mary and John. 
Rather, it is correct to say Smith knows the plane will land in Chicago. So, it would 
be a mistake to conclude that mere salience is sufficient to motivate a denial; in 
other words, to merely suggest the possibility one is wrong in everyday use of 




To be sure, a salient alternative can have that affect if we don’t recognize it 
is unlikely. But the issue is easily explained since it is quite possible that a 
subject/we believe it is likely even though it is not. It seems plausible that this is 
what occurs with the Airport and Bank examples for those who intuit that high-
stakes denials are correct.69 If they believe it is likely p is false (as does the 
attributor), it is only rational to question the evidence for the original belief and so 
withhold believing that p is true. If that is the case, then “S doesn’t know that p” is 
the rational conclusion. 
We also know from the printer example in Chapter 2 that some alternatives 
must be ruled out whether they are salient to the attributor or not. The subject 
doesn’t have easy access to knowledge simply because an alternative is not salient. 
Alternatives to p that are sufficiently likely must be addressed in order to truly say 
“S knows that p.” In Printer-Airport, Smith doesn’t know about the issue with the 
printer software, but that is irrelevant to whether he knows. Given the high 
probability that the itinerary he’s holding contains a mistake, it isn’t a reliable piece 
of evidence. So, Smith doesn’t know the plane will land in Chicago.  
Applying this point to our intuitions about the software issue, the same 
results follow. Even though we are unaware of the issue when first considering his 
                                                             
69 See section 2.4. The essential point is that, in ordinary situations, if we take some alternative q to 
undermine knowing that p, we don’t concurrently believe that q is unlikely. That aside, it is of course 
possible that the alternatives are very likely. If that is the case, our intuition is correct, but, as I argue in 
Chapter 2, Smith’s original claim to know is false. Not simply false from the attributor’s context, but false 





case, our original intuition was incorrect. Once we are informed of the problem 
with printer software, it is clear the itinerary is not reliable.70 If we extended this 
to include the attributor, the same would be true. Were the attributor unaware of 
the printer issue and so attributes knowledge to Smith, the attributor would be 
wrong. So, being salient to the attributor is not a determining factor of whether 
something needs to be ruled out to correctly attribute knowledge.  
Salience is relevant to our intuitions, but to motivate a change in intuition 
from “S knows that p” to “S doesn’t know that p”, the alternative must at least 
appear to be a sufficiently likely possibility that p is false. When it is quite low as in 
the Alien case, denying knowledge is not intuitive, but when it is sufficiently likely 
in the Printer case, then it is intuitive to deny knowledge. But if it is the probability 
of the alternative—whether real or only apparent—which drives our intuition, the 
use of the attributor in third person cases only serves to distract us from the central 
issue of whether there is sufficient reason to deny the subject’s claim to know.71  
                                                             
70 Attributing knowledge in the alien case and denying it in the printer case seems correct no matter what 
the stakes may be. In the printer case someone wouldn’t, for instance, know the plane will land in Chicago 
if there were absolutely nothing at stake for them. The sufficiently high possibility the itinerary is in error 
seems to prevent knowledge no matter one’s circumstances and assuming their evidence has not changed. 
On the opposite end, no matter how high the stakes, it doesn’t seem at all correct to deny that someone 
knows because of the Alien possibility. The possibility of an alien attack is just too low to matter at all. 
 
71 At this point, it is natural to ask what factors determine whether an alternative to p is ‘sufficiently likely’ 
so that it poses a threat knowing that p. A full-blown account of ‘relevance’ goes beyond the purposes of 
this project. However, it does seem to me that certain ‘intuitive tests’ will help us determine whether an 
alternative must be considered and when it can be ignored which I discuss in the next section and 
elsewhere. For instance, one test I discuss is whether it holds up to the sort of scrutiny offered in the 





So, although the contextualist moved to third-person cases to avoid 
problems discussed in Chapter 1, they fare no better by doing so. The inclusion of 
an attributor is irrelevant to what we intuit and so those cases can be ignored.72 
Rather, we should focus on cases like Schaffer’s which remove any bias or 
problematic differences. For the invariantist, this is good news because those cases 
appear to support their position. 
§3.3 Alternatives that ‘Must’ be considered. 
 As discussed in the previous section, it seems that some alternatives can be 
ignored outright—whether a subject knows is not dependent upon ruling out these 
alternatives. On the other hand, some alternatives must be addressed whether 
salient or not. Whether a subject knows does depend on ruling out these 
alternatives whether salient or not. I take it that these are uncontroversial ideas, at 
least, from an ordinary, everyday understanding of knowledge attributions. From 
the invariantist, every alternative will fall into one of these two categories. To 
illustrate, each box below represents one of the two categories, the arrow 
indicating an increasing probability and the space in-between, the ‘probability 
threshold’ that separates the two:  
                                                             
72 John Turri (2016) points to a further issue—in many instances people simply defer to the speaker. Turri 
reasons that “they might assume that others are well positioned to report on their own mental states.” 
(142) I would further add that this seems a likely explanation in cases in which one is not acquainted with 
the relevant facts. For example, in Cohen’s Airport, it seems perfectly reasonable that airlines do have late 
changes to flight plans from time to time. However, few people will specifically know how often that 
happens. So, without reasoning further—as Smith does in the rebuttal case—perhaps, we are prone to 






If this view is correct, the alternatives discussed in the original Bank and Airport 
cases (i.e. the bank may have changed its hours; the flight itinerary may contain 
an error) would fall into one of these two categories. Moreover, if correct, the 
contextualist would lose significant support for their view since the only 
determiner of whether an alternative must be ruled out is its probability—context 
is irrelevant.73  
As a rebuttal to this view and the foregoing arguments, the contextualist 
might reply that the alternatives mentioned in the original Bank and Airport cases 
must be ruled specifically because they are salient. To be sure, if they were not salient, 
they wouldn’t need to be ruled out. Yet, their probability is enough so that if salient, 
they must be ruled. This response follows from a central aspect of contextualism; 
that is, the idea that salience plays a primary role in what alternatives must be 
ruled out. To be sure, any alternative that must be ruled out will have to reach a 
minimal threshold and there is a higher-threshold that, if met, the possibility must 
be ruled out even if not salient. However, there is also an intermediate threshold in 
which the probability is high enough to require being ruled out if salient (e.g. 
changing bank hours), but not so high that it must be ruled out independently of 
                                                             
73 In chapter 2, I argued that they fall into the first category because they rest on a mistake—the 
probabilities are low, but mistakenly thought to be high enough to warrant consideration. 
Probability not sufficient to 
require ruling out. (e.g. alien 
attack. see 2.4)
Probability sufficient to 
require ruling out whether 





being salient (e.g. printer issues—Printer-Airport). I’ll refer to these as intermediate 
alternatives.  
Below I’ve modified the illustration from above to coincide with the 
contextualist interpretation. Again, the arrows indicate the increasing probability 
of the alternative possibility and each threshold is represented by a separate box. 
As you can see, an additional box has been included in the middle to represent the 
proposed intermediate alternatives:  
 
The most critical issue for the contextualist is whether or not there is an 
intermediate threshold which represents alternatives that must be ruled out if 
salient, but don’t need to be ruled out if not salient. If so, the contextualist could 
argue that context—and specifically salience—is a determining factor of whether 
a knowledge attribution is true. The reason being that we must look at the context 
to see if the alternative in question is salient or not. For example, in the airport case 
the alternative suggested by Mary and John is not salient in Smith’s context. So, 
his knowledge claim is true. But it is salient in Mary and John’s context. So, their 
knowledge denial is true. 
This interpretation also provides a contextualist-friendly response to 
Schaffer’s unbiased minimal pairs. The contextualist can simply explain that 
Probability not 
sufficient to 
require ruling out. 
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Schaffer’s intuitions are correct because the alternatives raised are of the 
intermediate variety. So, Schaffer correctly intuits that both subjects know when 
the alternative possibility is not salient, and he correctly intuits that both subjects 
do not know when the alternative is salient.  
 For this view to be plausible, we should expect to find some instances of 
intermediate possibilities, and we can assume that the alternatives from the 
original Bank and Airport cases are paradigmatic. So, we would expect these 
alternatives to be of a kind which must be considered and ruled out—if they are 
mentioned—in order to appropriately and truly attribute knowledge to a subject. 
Again, these alternatives must be ruled out specifically because they raise a 
sufficiently high possibility that the original belief could be wrong. This 
interpretation implies that the evidence used in the case is not itself unreliable, but 
instead it is the salient possibility that is unreliable.  
Take, for instance, a version of the original Airport case in which the 
itinerary is not questioned and instead is used to support Mary and John’s belief 
that the plane will land in Chicago:  
Airport-Posted: “Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating 
taking a certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight 
has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if anyone knows 
whether the flight makes any stops. Another passenger, Smith, replies, “I 
know – I remember when I ordered the tickets that we first go to Chicago, 
then New York." It turns out that Mary and John have a very important 
business contact they have to meet at the Chicago airport. Mary says [to 
John], “That guy said he remembers seeing it on the flight plan when he 
bought his tickets, but what if he remembers it incorrectly and we are 
actually stopping over in Cincinnati? Or what if the flight plan has changed 




and John agree that Smith doesn’t really know that the plane will stop in 
Chicago. They decide to find an itinerary, which they do, and then conclude 
they know the plane will land in Chicago.” 
 
It seems reasonable for Mary and John to take the itinerary as good evidence in 
this version prompting us to wonder why it isn’t good evidence in the original 
example. The difference cannot be a change in the possibility that there is an 
error—objectively, both cases are the same in that regard.  
The contextualist might suggest that the itinerary stands as good evidence 
in one case because there is no salient reason that suggests the itinerary has an 
error, but it is not good evidence in the other because there the risk is higher and 
there is a salient reason. In contextualist terms, the truth-conditions change when 
there is a salient reason, and this is why the itinerary is good (i.e. sufficient) 
evidence in one, but not the other. 
 This view doesn’t hold up if we look at further variations of the Airport 
case in which the possibility of error is salient but doesn’t intuitively require being 
ruled out if the attributor ignores them for some reason. One such instance was 
already hinted at in section 2.5 when discussing the original airport case. There I 
pointed out that it would seem quite reasonable for Mary to concede Smith is 
probably correct even though she raised the possibility the itinerary could be 
wrong. She then suggests they double-check anyway and that seems like a prudent 
option for them. Even more important is the fact she does not deny that Smith 




salience does not explain why the itinerary is good enough evidence in one case, 
but not the other. 
I think this case is enough to seriously question the idea that there are 
intermediate alternatives. Yet, the fact Mary doesn’t attribute knowledge to Smith 
might leave an opening for the contextualist since they could argue that, at the 
very least, it would be false for Mary to attribute knowledge to Smith. In short, 
withholding a denial is compatible with the contextualist view, but attributing 
knowledge is not. Since we’ve only seen an example of the former, there is no 
evidence against intermediate alternatives. 
Such a response wouldn’t free them completely of the problem raised by 
Mary conceding that Smith “is probably right”, but it would alleviate some of the 
sting. Nevertheless, we can push this issue further and look at a case in which 
Mary does attribute knowledge to Smith: 
Airport-NoDeny: Mary and John are at the L.A. airport contemplating 
taking a certain flight to New York. They want to know whether the flight 
has a layover in Chicago. They overhear someone ask if anyone knows 
whether the flight makes any stops. Another passenger, Smith, replies, “I 
do. I just looked at my flight itinerary and there is a stop in Chicago." It 
turns out that Mary and John have a very important business contact they 
need to meet at the Chicago airport. Mary says [to John], “How reliable is 
that itinerary, anyway? It could contain a misprint. They could have 
changed the schedule since it was printed or something else.” Mary pauses 




sure he is right—He knows the plane is going to Chicago." John agrees. Both 
take a seat and wait to board.74 
The same error possibilities from the original case are included here, yet 
Mary’s reaction is appropriate. I don’t find her claim that “he is right” odd or 
unreasonable nor do I find their decision to take a seat and wait to board 
imprudent.75 However, if the ‘intermediate alternative’ view is correct, Mary’s 
response should be intuitively false or, at least, imprudent. Once the alternative is 
mentioned, it must be ruled out, but that is not the case when she concedes he is 
“probably right” nor when she states he knows the plane will land in Chicago. 
Mary’s response in these cases make further sense if we take into account the 
conclusions of the previous chapter.76  
If I am right that Mary’s denial in the original case rests on a mistake, there 
is nothing odd about the fact she doesn’t follow through with the denial in the 
concession case. And the same can be said about her decision not to deny in the 
                                                             
74 In section 2, I argued that the inclusion of an attributor is essentially irrelevant to these cases. So, the use 
of an attributor here might appear disingenuous, and I would be inclined to agree if that were not the 
contextualist strategy. However, since contextualists have typically employed an attributor to support their 
view and the claim is that a salient alternative of sufficient probability must be ruled out, we should expect 
the standard intuition to disagree with Mary and John. Moreover, if we arrange the case to focus solely on 
the subject, i.e. Smith, so that he raises the same concerns as Mary, it again seems fine to me if he points 
out that he is simply worried and just takes a seat. 
 
75 I slightly waver about the ‘imprudence’ issue since it would be very easy for them to double-check. In 
such cases it may seem imprudent if you don’t check given the opportunity.  Even so, it is not obvious that 
‘prudentially justified double-checking’ is somehow indicative of not knowing.  We’ll touch on these issues 
in chapter 4. 
 






case just described.77 So, as it stands, arguing that there are certain ‘intermediate 
alternatives’ is not a plausible route. 
§3.4 What About Very High Stakes? 
In this last section we will look at one more attempt to find a case that 
provides good support for contextualists. In general, the best support for 
contextualism would come from a case in which the alternative is salient in both 
the high and low stakes, but it is only intuitive that the high stakes subject does not 
know. Schaffer’s unbiased minimal pairs suggest that such a result isn’t supported 
by standard intuitions. So, it looks like mere differences in what is at stake does 
not motivate our intuitions about knowledge attributions and denials.78  
Yet, this doesn’t entirely close off the idea that stakes can independently 
motivate a knowledge denial. One way for the contextualist to respond is to 
suggest that we look at an extreme case in which the stakes are incredibly high 
and there is no salient alternative. If our intuition is to deny knowledge in such 
cases, then perhaps the issue with the original cases is simply that the stakes 
weren’t high enough. So, we need a case that includes a sufficiently high increase 
                                                             
77 On the other hand, when the denial does not rest on a mistake, then an unwillingness to check further 
and/or deny that Smith knows would be troubling. For instance, in the printer case from 2.4, she has very 
good reason to question the reliability of the itinerary. So, it would be epistemically (and practically) 
irresponsible to ignore that issue. 
 
78 This same point can be applied to the case in which she concedes “he is probably right, but I want to 
check anyway.” 
 
78 On the other hand, when the denial does not rest on a mistake, then an unwillingness to check further 
and/or deny that Smith knows would be troubling. For instance, in the printer case from 2.4, she has very 
good reason to question the reliability of the itinerary. So, it would be epistemically (and practically) 




in stakes. In this section, we will look at a case with very high stakes to assess the 
plausibility of this suggestion. Whether we intuit that the person knows or not, I 
will argue that, in either circumstance, the least plausible explanation is that the 
high stakes have motivated our intuitions.  
To begin, consider the following bank case in which the stakes have been 
dramatically increased: 
Bank-Ransom: While waiting in line at the bank, Keith receives a phone 
call that his child has been kidnapped. (Let’s assume he has good evidence 
that this is true.) The kidnappers demand that he transfers money to an 
offshore account as ransom for the child. If he doesn’t get the money 
deposited by 12:00pm on Saturday, then his child will be murdered. To 
have enough money to meet their demands, Keith needs to deposit the 
check he is holding. Again, his evidence that the bank will be open on 
Saturday is his previous visit a few weeks prior. Does Keith know if the 
bank will be open the following day?79 
 
As with the previous bank examples, assume that Keith retains his belief the bank 
will be open on Saturday and that this belief is true—the bank will be open. For 
my part, Keith knows that the bank will be open on Saturday, but that does not 
imply he would be justified to wait for the following day. For the same reasons 
discussed above, it would be practically irrational—not to mention morally 
irresponsible—for Keith to wait and deposit the money at a later time.80  
                                                             
issue. 
 
xample is a modified version of a case from Bruce Russell (2005, 35). 
 
80 Consider if Keith decided to stop in the Dunkin’ Donuts next door to the bank before heading over to the 
deposit the check. There is virtually no risk that the bank will close in the 5 minutes time it takes him to buy 
a coffee and donut. However, doing so is still irresponsible for several reasons. For my part, this suggests 
that the cases have very little to do with banks changing their hours. As mentioned, we’ll discuss this more 





For the sake of discussion, however, let’s assume that the standard response 
is to intuit Keith doesn’t know. Would the incredibly high stakes explain this? 
There are two good reasons to conclude that high stakes are not the motivating 
factor. 
First, there are countless everyday examples in which there is a lot at stake, 
but intuitively they do not affect a person’s knowledge. Consider the claim, “I 
know that my furnace is functioning correctly.” On rare occasions home furnaces 
do explode. So, it is possible that my furnace has a malfunction which will 
eventually lead to a large explosion and the death or serious injury of anyone 
currently in the home. A furnace that is malfunctioning and at risk of exploding 
represents an incredible cost, but would the risk alone motivate denying I know 
my furnace is functioning correctly without any further evidence or reason to do 
so? It seems fair to say that it does not—if it did, then I should be on the phone 
immediately to get someone over to my house and look at it. Even though the 
stakes are very high, it doesn’t motivate denying that I know.  
We can apply these same thoughts to many common, every day issues in 
which there is a lot at stake, but it is incredibly unlikely that a bad outcome will 
occur: driving a car, walking along a street, standing under a tree, swimming in a 
lake, etc. In each of these cases, it seems incorrect to deny that a person knows 




independently motivated denials, however, we should expect the opposite when 
the higher stakes are salient.81 
Even if we assume that it is intuitive to deny Keith knows in the ransom 
case the contextualist must also explain why it is not intuitive to deny that I know 
my furnace is functioning correctly. If high stakes aren’t enough to deny in one 
case, but are high enough in another, what accounts for the difference? Since both 
the ransom and furnace cases have incredibly high stakes, it would be arbitrary to 
try and explain the difference of intuition in terms of a difference in what it as 
stake.  
This leads to the second issue: the idea Keith should check further seems to 
assume that waiting till the following day to make the deposit is a reasonable 
option as long as Keith knows the bank will be open. In effect, the question “Does 
Keith know the bank will be open?” is presented in such a way so that one’s 
response will either support or reject his waiting till the next day. Otherwise, what 
is the purpose of checking further? Yet, as the case is written, in no way does 
waiting till the next day seem at all reasonable. (I would argue that it is also 
unreasonable to do so in the original case—whatever the evidence for the bank 
being open the following day.) Even if Keith checks further and it is confirmed 
that the bank will be open at 9:00am, it would still be morally and practically 
irresponsible for him to wait for the following day.  
                                                             
81 By ‘independently’, I mean that what is at stake cannot motivate a change in attributing or denying 





So, a case like Bank-Ransom is perplexing because it implies that our 
intuition about whether he knows will determine what he should do. But no amount 
of evidence the bank will be open on Saturday would justify waiting for the next 
day. The reason being that deciding to wait till the following day is determined by 
multiple factors and not simply whether the bank will be open. For example, 
waiting to go to the bank on Saturday should be worth it and, for this example, 
there is no obvious sense in which that is the case. I will take up this issue further 
in the next chapter where I argue that knowing p is not sufficient to justify acting 
on p. Rather, the act must also be worth it, and it is clear in Bank-Ransom that 














Chapter 4: Intellectualism and Practicalism 
Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter I addressed the problem that contextualism raises 
for the invariantist component of the traditional view. Although contextualists and 
traditionalist differ in this regard, they do agree that only epistemic reasons—i.e. 
truth-conducive reasons—are relevant to a subject’s justification for belief. This 
‘intellectualist’ view has been opposed by those who argue that practical reasons 
are also relevant. Beginning with their 2002 article “Evidence, Pragmatics, and 
Justification,” Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath suggested that practical issues 
(e.g. the level of risk) impose a necessary condition on knowledge.82 In low stakes 
cases, one has, in a sense, more practical justification for acting on p and so less 
epistemic justification is needed to know that p. But when the stakes are higher, 
one has less practical justification and so greater epistemic justification is required. 
The authors continued to support and refine this idea in their book 
Knowledge in an Uncertain World. There they argue for the KJ principle discussed in 
chapter 1: 
KJ: If you know that p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in Փ-ing, 
for any Փ. 
 
                                                             
82 The list of opponents to intellectualism also includes Jason Stanley (2005) and John Hawthorne (2004). 





If KJ is true, then invariantism fails—as it also does if contextualism is true—but 
the intellectualist thesis likewise fails because practical issues directly factor into 
whether one’s epistemic justification is sufficient for knowledge.  
In this chapter, I will defend the intellectualist thesis in two ways. First, I 
will argue that the argument for KJ fails as a result of a variation on Reed’s 
counterexample that we discussed in 1.7. Fantl and McGrath argue that Baron 
Reed’s counterexample isn’t successful, but I will show that they have failed to 
recognize the force of the example. In particular, we will see that intellectualism is 
consistent with the intuitive response given by both Reed’s original example and 
Fantl and McGrath’s proposed response, whereas KJ is only consistent with the 
latter. Following this, I will argue that Reed’s counterexample also applies to the 
Safe Reasons principle at use in their argument. As a result, the principled 
argument does in fact fail. 
Second, once the argument for KJ is out of the way, I will defend the 
subject’s claim to know in Reed’s counterexample by showing that his response 
and refusal to act is plausibly explained by the tendency of individuals to be risk 
averse. We’ll look at some cases to support this conclusion in 4.3. Moreover, once 
we better understand the subject’s responses in light of these cases, we’ll also find 
that interpreting these cases in terms of KJ has some very odd results. For example, 
KJ implies that subjects can acquire and lose knowledge solely because of an 




These issues will be discussed in section 4.4. Given these principled and 
explanatory problems, we have good reasons to reject KJ.  
§4.1 The Explanatory Benefits of KJ 
 As mentioned in the first chapter, one of the motivations for adopting the 
KJ principle is that it solves the threshold problem for fallibilism about knowledge. 
On the fallibilist view, one can know that p even if their justification for p does not 
guarantee that p is true. Fallibilism gets a lot of intuitive support from the fact that 
it seems right we know a lot. But despite that intuitive support, it is not at all clear 
what amount of justification is needed for knowledge. Clearly, ambiguous phrases 
such as “the weight of reasons” won’t settle the issue and it would be arbitrary, 
for instance, to declare a specific probability which must be met. 
 KJ solves this problem by setting the threshold to a level that warrants 
“putting knowledge to work.” In other words, if your justification for p is enough 
to warrant using that knowledge to justify a further action or belief, then you’ve 
hit the threshold. If it doesn’t put you into a position to justify further action or 
belief, then you haven’t hit the threshold.  
In addition to solving the threshold problem, the authors mention several 
other factors they take to favor this principle. In particular, they suggest that KJ 
Makes smooth sense of our habits of citing knowledge to criticize or justify 
action. We tend to think that, once we’ve settled a matter theoretically—
once we can say, “Oh, o.k., at least we know that”; we can then count on it 
in action as well as a belief.”83 
                                                             





For example, it’s natural to say something like “I know the dog will escape so I 
shut the gate” or “I stopped looking because I know I left my keys on the fridge.” 
Without question these sorts of examples are commonplace in ordinary situations. 
In the same way, the lack of knowledge often explains why someone shouldn’t do 
something, rationally speaking. For example, if someone claims, “I know the dog 
won’t escape”, but it doesn’t seem rational for them to leave the gate open, a 
plausible explanation is that they really don’t know the dog won’t escape. To be 
sure, such examples don’t get us all the way to KJ. However, they do force us to 
consider the fact that knowledge and action are closely related in ordinary use. 
In addition to solving the threshold problem and capturing how we 
ordinarily use knowledge, KJ also provides a straightforward explanation of cases 
like Airport and Fantl and McGrath’s own train case (See 1.8). In each case, the 
important difference is that it is intuitively reasonable for the low-stakes subject to 
ignore the chance their belief is in error, but for the high-stakes subject it is not.84 
In the train case, both believe that the 201 is the local and both have the same 
evidence for that belief. Since they both have the same evidence—and their 
evidence doesn’t guarantee the 201 is the local—they also have the same weakness 
in their epistemic position. The difference is that, while that weakness isn’t too 
much for the low-stakes subject, it is too much for the high-stakes subject. Since 
                                                             





the high-stakes subject should inquire further, it is reasonable to conclude that he 
doesn’t know. Further inquiry is typically a good indication that more evidence is 
needed to know. That seems especially true in cases when inquiring further seems 
to be the only rational option. 
The problem with KJ is that it implies practical factors directly affect 
whether you know. This point is not lost on Fantl and McGrath as even they 
recognize that denying intellectualism looks ‘mad’ on the face of it. However, they 
suggest that we need to contrast this apparent madness with the explanatory 
benefits of such a view. But even more, we should also be honest about the 
madness of fallibilism as David Lewis suggested in the following: 
“If you are a contented fallibilist, I implore you to be honest, be naïve, her 
it afresh. ‘He knows, yet he has not eliminated all possibilities of error. Even 
if you’ve numbed your ears, doesn’t this overt, explicit fallibilism still 
sound wrong?”85 
 
The underlying point is that, if we are to be fallibilist, we should really have 
something to say about what amount of error in our justification is permissible. 
An explanation that makes it sound not so wrong and KJ offers a very clear way of 
doing this even if it does fly in the face of the traditional view. While that may be 
true, in the following sections I will argue that these explanatory benefits are not 
sufficient to override the problems with the view. 
 
 
                                                             




§4.2 JB-Know and JB-Deny. 
Near the end of chapter 1, we looked at Baron Reed’s counterexample to KJ. 
In the example, Jack is involved in a contest and asked when Julius Caesar is born. 
If he answers correctly he gets a jelly bean and if not, he is given a painful electric 
shock. There is no penalty (or reward) if he doesn’t answer. The table below lays 
out the possible outcomes: 





Answer Jelly Bean Electric Shocks 
No Answer None None 
 
Having considered his options and noting the severe consequences if he answers 
incorrectly or something else goes awry, he says to himself “I know he was born 
in 100 B.C., but [answering] isn’t worth the risk.”86 The point of this case is to 
provide an example in which acting on p would not be justified, but the subject 
still knows that p. If it is, then we have a counterexample to KJ because Jack knows 
that p, but that knowledge would not justify acting on p. Let’s refer to this version 
of the case as JB-Know. 
Fantl and McGrath acknowledge that Jack’s response doesn’t “raise any 
eyebrows”, but they also suggest that it wouldn’t be out of the ordinary to respond 
with the following:  
                                                             





“Do I really know that Caesar was born in 100 BC or am I just pretty 
confident about it? Well, I thought I knew this before, but after thinking 
about the risk, I guess I really don’t know after all. I better not answer.”87  
Facing the same circumstances, this subject isn’t so sure that he knows when 
Caesar was born. There is simply too much at risk, so he decides not to answer. 
(Note that the outcomes are the same as listed in Table 4.) According to KJ, if the 
subject isn’t justified acting on p, the subject doesn’t know that p. Since that seems 
to be what happened in this version—Jack isn’t justified in answering, so he 
doesn’t know—it looks like we have an alternative to JB-Know that is consistent 
with KJ. Let’s refer to this version of the case as JB-Deny. 
§4.2 Counterbalancing Intuitions? 
Fantl and McGrath take it that their version of the case (JB-Deny) 
neutralizes Reed’s original case and so frees them from the counterexample: 
“The point is not that Reed’s case doesn’t provide evidence against KJ. It’s 
that we have two counterbalancing intuitions about the case: one is that an 
insistence on knowledge would be natural, and another that a denial of 
knowledge would be natural.”88 
Looking at this response, the most important claim is that there are 
‘counterbalancing intuitions’. What could they mean by this? What Fantl and 
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McGrath seem to be thinking is that Jack’s different responses contradict each 
other and so one of the responses must be wrong. In other words, even though we 
think that Jack’s claim to know in JB-Know and that his denial in JB-Deny are 
natural, they are incompatible with each other because the claim to know and the 
claim to deny can’t both be true. Both seem right, but one of these intuitions must 
be false.  
Interpreting the cases in this way suggests they are like other cases in which 
we appear to have contradictory intuitions such as the standard trolley and 
transplant scenarios. The point of these cases is, in part, to answer the question 
“Are consequences or deontological considerations more foundational to moral 
justification?” In Trolley, we are asked if it would be morally acceptable (and 
perhaps obligatory) to switch the track so that a train bearing down on five people 
will change to a track in which only 1 person would be killed. Most think this is 
the right thing to do, or at least that it is morally permissible. However, when 
considering a case in which someone could save five people by harvesting the 
organs of one innocent person—and thereby killing him—most intuit that it would 
be the wrong thing to do and so not morally permissible. For the Trolley case, it 
looks as if the consequences justify the action, but for Transplant some 
deontological consideration puts a stop to the consequentialist justification.89 On 
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both examples, we’ll save five lives while sacrificing the life of one person and it 
is hard to say why sacrificing the one is acceptable in Trolley, but not Transplant.  
The principle issue is that neither view seems capable of accommodating 
both intuitions—consequentialism can only accommodate the intuition in Trolley 
and a pure deontological view can only accommodate the intuition in Transplant. 
So, in terms of the competing views, our intuitions are ‘counter-balancing’ because 
both views receive equal support and opposition from the cases. In short, we are 
at an impasse between consequentialism and the deontological position. 
Do we find something similar when comparing the invariantist and 
practicalist interpretation of JB-Know and JB-Deny? As with trolley and 
transplant, we have two cases that result in two intuitions that, at first glance, 
appear to oppose one another. And, as Fantl and McGrath seem to think, perhaps 
neither the invariantist nor the practicalist view can explain both. This is correct 
regarding the practicalist view because it implies that JB-Deny is true while JB-
Know is false. Since we do not intuit that JB-Know is incorrect—as even Fantl and 
McGrath agree—their view is not consistent with one of our intuitions. If at least 
one intuition is also not compatible with intellectualism, that would suggest our 
intuitions are contradictory, and, like the consequentialist v. deontology debate, 
we are at an impasse.  
The problem is that the intellectualist view does not imply that either 
intuition is incorrect. To explain the difference between the cases, the intellectualist 




effect, Jack’s denial implies that he has either had a change of evidence (CEP) 
and/or change of belief (COB) that results in his denying that he knows.90 Since 
intellectualism provides a plausible and validating interpretation of both 
intuitions, there is no impasse between the views and, thus, talk of ‘counter-
balancing’ intuitions is incorrect.  
So, rather than two ‘counterbalancing intuitions’, the fact of the matter is 
that we have one view, intellectualism, which can accommodate both intuitions 
and another view, practicalism, which must deny Jack’s claim to know in JB-Know 
even though it seems natural.  On the intellectualist view, both responses found in 
JB-Know and JB-Deny are true. More to the point, there are no contradictory or 
‘counterbalancing intuitions’ since we can offer CEP or COB as an explanation. 
When someone claims to know and has good reasons in support of that claim, then 
it is natural to think their claim is true. And when someone denies they know 
because they lack sufficient reason—and we have no reason to suspect that they 
are being insincere, etc.—then it is quite natural to think that claim is true. This is 
precisely what we see in these examples above, and it is consistent with the 
intellectualist view that only epistemic reasons are relevant to knowledge.  
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On the other hand, Fantl and McGrath’s view implies that Jack’s claim in 
JB-Know is false because his belief that Caesar was born in 100 BC isn’t warranted 
enough to justify answering the question. According to KJ, this means that he 
doesn’t know Caesar’s birth date which conflicts with our intuition that his claim 
to know is natural and appropriate. To be sure, intuiting that the claim is natural 
and appropriate doesn’t mean it is in fact true.  So, Fantl and McGrath can avoid 
the conflict with our intuitions if they can show that Jack’s claim is false. One way 
to accomplish this is by showing that KJ is true via the ‘principled argument’ they 
offer in support of KJ. If their principled argument is sound, then KJ is true and 
Reed’s counterexample fails because the subject’s claim to know when Caesar was 
born is false—even if we take it to be true. In the next section, I will argue that the 
principled argument is not sound because the second premise, SafeReasons, is also 
susceptible to Reed’s counterexample. 
§4.3 Against the Principled Argument 
In the previous sections we have discussed Reed’s counterexample to KJ 
which implies that KJ is false. Since we intuit JB-Know to be correct, we have some 
reason to think KJ is false. However, the problem with Reed’s approach is that it 
has left the principled argument for KJ untouched, and Fantl and McGrath can use 
it to support KJ. So, to convincingly show that KJ is false we need to show where 




Let’s begin with a review of the principled argument for KJ which includes 
the two premises, KR91 and SafeReasons: 
(1) KR: If you know that p, then p is warranted enough to be a reason you have 
[for Փ-ing], for any Փ. 
 
(2) SafeReasons: If p is a reason you have to Փ, then p is warranted enough to 
justify you in Փ-ing, for any Փ. 
 
KJ: If you know that p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in Փ-ing, for 
any Փ. 
 
The problem I want to raise for the principled argument is that JB-Know also 
seems to work as a counterexample to SafeReasons. In JB-Know, Jack says “I know 
Caesar was born in 100 BC, but it isn’t worth the risk.” As Fantl and McGrath 
accept, this response seems appropriate and won’t “raise any eyebrows” even 
though KJ implies that it is false. Jack’s claim to know is false if the principled 
argument is sound. However, if we consider a version of Reed’s counterexample 
in terms of SafeReasons, we also seem to get a counterexample to that principle 
from which it follows that the principled argument is not sound.  
So, instead of Jack claiming to know, let’s consider that Jack instead claimed 
the following: “I have very good support for believing that Caesar was born in 
100BC and that is a reason for me to answer, but it isn’t worth the risk.” As with Reed’s 
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original case, there is nothing odd or ‘eyebrow raising’ about someone saying they 
have a reason to act, but to further say they would not be justified to act on that 
reason.92 So, it is natural to conclude that Jack’s claim is true. If correct, then we 
have a counterexample to a premise in the principled argument and so the 
argument fails. Since Fantl and McGrath need the principled argument to show 
Jack’s claim in JB-Know is false, we are without a good reason for concluding that 
it is.  
 Fantl and McGrath could respond to this counterexample in the same way 
they responded to Reed’s original case. They might point out that Jack could also 
say “I thought I had a reason, but after thinking about the risk I’m not so sure I do 
have that as a reason and so I’m not going to answer.” This response, however, 
wouldn’t provide much support to their view for two reasons. First, the response 
doesn’t align with ordinary use of reasons since Jack goes so far as to deny that his 
belief Caesar was born in 100AD is even a reason to answer. But in everyday life 
we have reasons to do any number of things that would not be practically justified 
and that doesn’t seem to discount them as being a reason at all. Someone with a 
heart condition, for example, might love sausage and pepperoni and so have that 
as a reason to eat an entire large pizza, but that wouldn’t justify doing so. Neither 
would it mean that it isn’t a reason to do so. 
                                                             




Second, the same points made in the previous section also apply here—
doubting one has reason and so refraining from action is a legitimate response, but 
it is something that poses no issue for intellectualism. A subject who sincerely 
doubts that they have sufficient epistemic support (i.e. warrant) to use p as a 
reason would lose p as a reason. That would result in a change to their epistemic 
position regarding p. So, a case in which the subject expresses doubt about p is not 
a strike against intellectualism.93  
Now that we see how a version of JB-Know also applies to SafeReasons, we 
have good reason to conclude that the principled argument is not successful. 
Without the principled argument to stand on, Fantl and McGrath have little 
recourse to argue that JB-Know is false and, moreover, they also need explain why 
his claim to know is intuitive and natural even though, on their view, it must be 
false.  
However, the intellectualist has some work of their own because they need 
to say why Jack’s decision not to answer is reasonable even though, according to 
their view, he does know. So, we are left with a debate over which of two views, 
intellectualism and practicalism, provide the best explanation of Jack’s claim and 
whether it is true or false—a situation they hoped to avoid with the principled 
argument. In the next few sections, I will argue that there is a plausible way to 
                                                             





understand these ‘practical intuitions’ which is compatible with intellectualism. 
‘We’ll also find that this leads to further problems for KJ. 
§4.4 Two Practicalist Assumptions 
If the conclusion of the previous section is correct, then the principled 
argument for KJ is not sound. A central goal of the principled argument was to 
avoid debates over competing intuitions, but with the failure of the argument we 
are again left with these debates. So, the failure of the principled argument doesn’t 
entirely rule out KJ since one could argue that KJ offers the best explanation of 
why we think answering the question in the Caesar case would be practically 
irrational. To be sure, it does seem as if there is an important relation between the 
amount of risk one is undertaking and the care that they should take in figuring 
out if it is the right course of action. When the risk is greater, it seems we should 
be more careful by checking our facts and evidence to make sure we got it right.  
But when the risk is lower, it seems that we don’t need to worry so much about 
being right. 
For the practicalist, the best explanation of this relation is that being 
practically justified is a necessary condition on knowledge. Looking at the cases 
discussed throughout—Airport, The Train Case (1.7), and Caesar, we might lean 
towards this sort of explanation because it seems that knowledge should be good 
enough to justify action. And if the action isn’t justified, then asking whether the 
subject has knowledge seems quite reasonable. This way of understanding the 




knowledge is good enough when the stakes are lower, why isn’t knowledge good 
enough when the stakes are higher?” To offer a plausible explanation of their own, 
intellectualists need to provide an answer to this question. 
The main problem for intellectualism comes about as a result of two implicit 
assumptions. The first is that knowing p is sufficient for rationally acting on p in 
low-stakes cases. In other words, the assumption that, in cases like Bank-Low, 
what rationally justifies the action is the fact the subject knows that p; i.e. assuming 
that ‘knowledge is good enough’ in at least some cases. If we assume the subject’s 
action is justified in Bank-Low because they know the bank is open the following 
day, then we’ve already accepted that knowing p is, at least in some instances, 
sufficient to justify acting on p. Let’s refer to this as the Sufficiency Principle: 
Sufficiency Principle (SP): If S knows that p, then it is practically rational 
for S to act on p. 
 
My primary concern is to vindicate Jack’s response in JB-Know. If SP is true, that 
claim would appear to be false since it does not seem rational for Jack to respond. 
I will argue that this principle is false—knowledge alone is not sufficient to justify 
action. So, the implicit idea that knowledge is ‘good enough’ even in the low-
stakes cases is false.  
This leads us to the second assumption that acting on p in the high-stakes 
cases is not rationally justified because the subject lacks sufficient justification to 
know that p. On Fantl and McGrath’s view, an increase in the negative outcome 




rationality of acting on p is a direct relationship between one’s justification for p 
and the risk of acting on p. When the risk goes up, so does the justification required 
to know and when it goes down, less is required. I will also argue that this 
assumption is false. Rather than a lack of epistemic justification, acting on p is not 
rationally justified because the action is not, practically speaking, worth it. What I 
mean by an action being ‘worth it’ will be discussed in the next section. 
The central argument is hinted at by Reed in his paper “Resisting 
Encroachment.” There he writes: 
“It’s not that knowledge gives you safe reasons in any situation, but rather 
that knowledge can be used as a reason only when it is safe to do so. But that 
much weaker conclusion does not underwrite a pragmatic condition on 
knowledge.”94 
 
I think Reed’s idea of something being ‘safe to do’ is essentially correct, but we 
need some clarification. Specifically, we need a better understanding of how it can 
be that someone knows that p but wouldn’t be justified to act on that knowledge. 
In what follows, I will argue that it isn’t the increase of risk, but the fact that acting 
on p is no longer worth it that makes acting on p practically irrational. This is true, 
even in cases in which the possibility of being unsuccessful is exceptionally low—
an action must still be worth it. We’ll also find that this intuitive understanding of 
practical action is more compatible with intellectualism than KJ.  
 
                                                             





§4.5 Actions that are Worth It 
When we act, we consider the various payoffs and penalties that might 
occur and our decision to act is, in part, based on whether the payoff is good 
enough to risk the penalty. How they compare will often determine what course 
of action we take (or don’t take). In general, looking at cases in which there is a 
non-zero chance of an unsuccessful outcome, the payoff must be sufficiently high 
in relation to the penalty. For instance, if the payoff of a successful act vastly 
outweighs the penalty if one is unsuccessful, then the action will likely be worth it 
and so practically rational.95 On the other hand, if the penalty sufficiently 
outweighs the good outcome, the action is most likely not worth it and so not 
practically rational to engage. The important implication is that, when an act 
appears to be practically irrational, it is not simply a matter of the risk that the 
outcome will be unsuccessful, but whether the risk of being unsuccessful is worth 
it in comparison to the possible gain. 
Before we examine some cases, there is one important point to discuss 
which I hinted at in the previous paragraph: there is no action of which the 
outcome is certain even though there are many actions for which the probability 
of a successful outcome is highly likely. Even in those cases the subject will incur 
some minimal amount of risk. Surely, the probabilities of each outcome will be an 
important aspect of decision making, but it is also a comparison of the outcomes 
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that matter. The fact that no outcome is guaranteed (i.e. there is a non-zero chance 
of being unsuccessful) weighs heavily on our reasoning and especially so when 
the consequences of a failed action would be far beyond what we can bear. It is 
important to keep this in mind as we discuss the following examples. 
Turning now to some modified versions of JB-Know, we’ll find that our 
practical intuitions—i.e. our intuitions about what it is rational to do—tend to 
track the ratio between the penalty and the payoff as opposed to tracking a relation 
between one’s justification for p and the risk of the penalty alone as KJ suggests. I’ll 
refer to this as the Worth It Thesis: 
Worth It Thesis (WIT): Acting on p is rationally justified for S only if the 
ratio between the outcome for successfully acting on p (i.e. the payoff) as 
compared to the outcome of an unsuccessful outcome (i.e. the penalty) is 
sufficiently high.96 
 
Immediately, we might wonder what sort of ratio between the payoff and penalty 
counts as ‘sufficiently high’. That is an important question but providing an 
answer to that question is beyond our purposes here. At the very least, there is an 
intuitive sense in which some actions ‘make sense’ because the possible gain or 
payoff is high enough to risk the possible loss or penalty. When the payoff is 
modified to achieve a favorable or unfavorable ratio between the payoff and 
penalty, we’ll find that our intuitions regarding the practical rationality of acting 
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on that knowledge also change. Some examples will be discussed in the follow 
sections. 
To put it another way, a poor ratio between the payoff and penalty results 
in what we ordinarily call an unnecessary risk; that is, a risk such that the benefit of 
performing an act is significantly outweighed by the possibility, even if unlikely, 
of a high negative outcome. In many cases, avoiding unnecessary risk has little do 
with the probability that the negative outcome will occur. For example, the 
probability that I will be in a fatal car crash is low, but the negative outcome is 
clearly significant. Thus, it would be an unnecessary risk to forgo wearing a 
seatbelt since the benefits are very minimal—at best, you are marginally more 
comfortable in your seat. Looking to the examples ahead, these sorts of 
considerations appear to be a leading factor in our intuitions about whether an 
action is practically rational. 
One more concern to discuss is that WIT might appear to suggest that 
changes in epistemic justification—even changes when one already has 
knowledge—do not alter whether an action is practically rational. Commonsense, 
however, suggests that epistemic justification is unquestionably relevant to 
practical rationality, and it is important to note that WIT does not conflict with 
this. Rather, WIT only suggests that there are at least two components that 
determine whether something is practically rational and one of these has to do 
with epistemic justification. In the cases ahead, we’ll find that changes in whether 




differences in epistemic justification might have the same effect as well. For 
example, if Jack was asked “What is 1+1?”, perhaps it is more reasonable to answer 
in that case than in the Caesar case. 
Yet, we must be careful here to distinguish between a case in which the 
person should have more epistemic justification vs. those cases in which the act 
just isn’t worth it. Certainly, there are cases like former, but my concern is with 
cases that have to do with the latter. If Jack’s problem is a lack of justification, then 
my point is mute, but the examples discussed below suggest that justification is 
not the issue in cases such as this, but the disparity in outcomes. This points to an 
important difference between the Sufficiency Principle and WIT. WIT allows that 
one can know that p even if it is not practically rational to act on that knowledge 
because it isn’t worth it. On the other hand, SP (and so KJ) imply that, for any 
instance in which it is not practically rational to act on p, one doesn’t know that p. 
But that implies there will be cases in which it is nearly impossible to have 
knowledge—even of ordinary propositions—because the negative outcome is 
simply too high. For example, if the penalty for answering incorrectly is the death 
of innocent bystanders, that would rule out the possibility of knowing the relevant 
proposition at all. In such a case, it doesn’t seem reasonable to answer if the payoff 
is only a jellybean. WIT, however, avoids these awkward results because it 






§4.6 The First Case: 10K 
Two cases will be discussed in support of WIT. First, we will look at a 
version of JB-Know in which the payoff increases for a successful outcome and a 
second in which it decreases. Aside from the change in payoff, everything else 
remains the same with specific regard to the following: 
(1) Jack’s epistemic justification for believing p. 
(2) The probabilities (either subjective or objective) of either outcome. 
(3) The penalty if unsuccessful.  
Jack has not received any additional information that would alter his current 
justification for p and the possibility of successfully acting on p has also not 
changed. So, Jack is just as likely to have a successful outcome as in JB-Know. 
When the outcomes include a jelly bean as a payoff and electric shock as a 
penalty, it seems that it would not be rational for Jack to answer the question. 
According to KJ, this implies that Jack lacks sufficient justification to know when 
Caesar was born. But let’s consider a further scenario in which the payoff is 
increased significantly: 
10K: After initially refusing to answer, Jack is then offered a payout of 
$10,000 if he answers correctly. While still risking an electric shock, Jack 
decides that $10,000 is enough to offset that risk and so he decides to 
answer. 
 
In this version, it does seem rational for Jack to act on p. At least, it seems rational 
if you think that $10,000 is enough to risk an electric shock, but perhaps you think 




number to your liking because it isn’t the specific number that matters. Rather, the 
essential point is that a high enough payoff will make it so that the action is 
practically rational without changing any other factors of the case. If merely 
changing the payoff to be more in line with the penalty is enough to alter our 
intuitions regarding the practicality of acting on p, we have little reason to 
conclude that the issue for Jack was a lack of justification for p and even less reason 
to think that a lack of knowledge was at issue. Rather, the better explanation is 
simply that the disparity between the penalty and the payoff is the crucial factor which 
determined that not answering is the rational thing to do.  
This response runs counter to KJ which implies that the increase to the 
penalty increased the justification required to know p.  On my view, the increased 
penalty is relevant to the practicality of acting on p, but its relevance concerns its 
relation to the payoff rather than to Jack’s justification for p. Why does this matter? 
On Fantl and McGrath’s view Jack loses knowledge because the risk of being 
wrong ‘stands in the way’ of his acting on p. In other words, when the stakes are 
low, the possibility he is wrong doesn’t matter. But when the stakes increase, that 
possibility becomes more of a concern. Thus, he needs better justification to know 
that p. So, the increased risk implies an increase in the justification required to 
know p and his current justification can’t account for the difference. This 
interpretation of the cases, as we discussed earlier, assumes that knowing p is 




However, if it is not the risk, but the poor ratio between the payoff and 
penalty that drives our practical intuitions in these cases, then the better 
explanation is that Jack should just avoid acting on p altogether because it isn’t 
worth it—it’s an unnecessary risk. This implies that Jack hasn’t lost knowledge 
and his response “I know he was born in 100 B.C., but [answering] isn’t worth the 
risk” is not only reasonable, but what we should expect in this situation. So, the 
justification he has for p and whether he knows that p is not the relevant issue. 
§4.7 The Second Case: Nickel 
One might think that these issues only arise at more extreme payoffs and 
penalties, but in fact the same seems to be true at lower amounts as well. Let’s 
assume again that Jack’s justification for p and the probabilities for each outcome 
stay the same. Again, there will be no change to his epistemic justification for p, to 
the penalty, or the probability of either outcome. 
Beginning with a payoff and penalty of $100, it seems quite reasonable for 
Jack to answer. However, what if the payoff is decreased to only a nickel while the 
penalty remains at $100? Again, all that has changed is a decrease in the payoff.97 
Under these conditions, it doesn’t seem practically rational to answer. As with the 
previous example, KJ implies that it isn’t rational for Jack to answer when the 
payoff drops because he doesn’t know.  
                                                             
97 As with the first case, if you don’t find the disparity to be sufficient, then simply alter the amounts. The 
issue is not whether this specific difference is enough, but whether a drop in the payoff that results in a 





According to WIT, Jack should refrain because it simply isn’t worth it. He 
knows the answer, but he lacks good reason to respond. Again, it would be quite 
reasonable for him to say, “I know he was born in 100 B.C., but [answering] isn’t 
worth the risk.” Even if he is extremely confident he knows the answer, it is 
unnecessary to take on the risk of losing $100 when he would only win a nickel. 
The essential point is, that our intuitions vindicate Jack’s claim because they seem 
to track the ratio between the payoff and penalty in these cases rather than any 
supposed issue with Jack’s epistemic justification. When the ratio is favorable, the 
action is rational, but when it is unfavorable, it is not. As with 10k there is no need 
to explain the change in terms of a weakness in his justification. 
§4.8 Two Replies 
In this section, I will consider two replies. First, it might be argued that, 
even though an action must be ‘worth it’, that just supports the idea that practical 
interests factor into knowledge in the way that KJ suggests. One reason this might 
appear to be the better explanation is that it is rational to act when the payoff and 
penalty are an even $10, but if we increase the amount so that both are $100,000, it 
doesn’t seem rational even though they are the same ratio. So, we have two sets of 
cases with the same ratio and so both are ‘worth it’, but we are only justified to act 
in one of the cases. One could then argue that the best explanation of this is that 
the subject’s justification for p is sufficient in the $10 case, but not the $100,000 case. 




case the subject neither knows p nor is he justified to act on p. Just as KJ would 
predict. 
Though the explicit monetary values are even, it does not follow that there 
is an even ratio. If I lose $10 that is a bit disappointing and I might miss out on a 
new book or a six-pack, but I wouldn’t put myself in danger of financial ruin. On 
the other hand, if I lose out on $100,000, it would result in great financial difficulty. 
Even though gaining $100,000 would surely be a great boon, the benefits that it 
would produce wouldn’t come near to offsetting the problems incurred by the 
loss.  
So, when assessing the ratio between the outcomes, it clearly isn’t just about 
the monetary value because a multitude of other factors will come into play.98 For 
instance, I might take the risk of losing $100,000 if gaining it would have some 
important implications. Perhaps, if I get that $100,000, then I would be able to save 
the lives of 10 people who would die otherwise. This change might alter whether 
the action is practically rational, but even if it does, it would clearly alter the ratio as 
well. Also, we might discuss the practicality of a billionaire risking $100,000 in 
contrast to myself. With a billionaire, the practicality quickly changes since she is, 
relative to our financial standing, risking far less than I am. Further examples 
verify the general point that external factors are relevant to the ratio between 
                                                             
98 Kahneman and Tversky make a similar point: “…the derived value(utility) function of an individual does 
not always reflect “pure” attitudes to money, since it could be affected by additional consequences 





payoff and penalty.99 So Fantl and McGrath are not helped by looking at cases in 
which the monetary ratio stays the same, but the amounts increase. 
 They might also argue that cases like 10K and Nickel aren’t relevant to the 
truth of KJ—the KJ principle is entirely compatible with the idea that our practical 
intuitions track the payoff/penalty ratio. So, it’s possible that the ‘Worth It’ thesis 
is true, but the subject also loses knowledge in high stakes/bad ratio cases. I grant 
that these cases don’t provide a straightforward rejection of KJ. Rather, the 
criticism comes in terms of the better explanation that Worth It and intellectualism 
provide over practicalism. In that regard, we can say a bit more and show how 
intellectualism should be favored over KJ. 
§4.9 KJ and Conversational Oddities 
First, if JB-Know and 10K are offered one after the other, we get some odd 
results by interpreting the outcome according to KJ. If KJ is true, then Jack doesn’t 
know in JB-Know because he isn’t justified to answer and so his claim to know 
would be false. However, once the payoff changes in 10K he is justified to answer 
which implies that he does know that p. Why would that be? The only change 
between the two cases is the increased payoff. So, it is reasonable to conclude that 
this should be our explanation if KJ is true—Jack acquires knowledge because the 
payoff increased. But clearly this is an odd sort of explanation. People don’t 
acquire knowledge because it would turn out better for them if they are successful 
                                                             
99 To make a fair assessment we would need to know, among other things, the subject’s socioeconomic 





in acting on that knowledge.  On the other hand, if we understand these cases 
according to the intellectualist view, we get no such oddities. Jack knows that p in 
both cases and the only difference is that it isn’t worth it for him to act in the first 
instance. 
In a similar way, an equally odd explanation occurs with the two cases 
involved in Nickel. At first the subject knows when the ratios are even, but once 
the payoff is decreased and it is no longer practical to act on p, the subject loses 
knowledge according to KJ. Again, no other factor changes except the payoff 
implying that one can lose knowledge simply because the payoff of a successful 
act decreases. Again, this is an odd result. People don’t lose knowledge because the 
outcome of successfully acting on that knowledge becomes less lucrative. As 
before, intellectualism provides a clean and intuitive explanation—Jack knows in 
both, but he is only practically justified to act in the case in which it is worth it for 
him to do so. 
Following the first point, if KJ is true, it would permit explaining the 
acquisition and loss of knowledge in counterintuitive ways. In correspondence 
with Fantl and McGrath, Mikkel Gerken points out that KJ permits citing practical 
reasons to defend knowledge attributions and denials and this leads to unordinary 
claims.100 For instance, someone could say they don’t know because the stakes are 
too high which seems counterintuitive.  
                                                             




A similar point applies to cases like 10K and Nickel. In the latter case, the 
payoff increased which resulted in making the action rational. If KJ is true, then 
Jack doesn’t know p when the payoff is low, but he does know p when the payoff 
is increased. This implies that he acquired knowledge as a result of an increase to 
the payoff. So, it would be appropriate to cite such a reason if asked to explain 
how the subject acquired knowledge between JB-Know and 10K. But clearly it 
would be odd for someone to say “Well I didn’t know p because the payoff was so 
low, but now the payoff increased. So, I do know that p.”  
The same issue arises when looking at the Nickel cases. If KJ is true, and the 
person loses knowledge when the payoff decreases, then it would be appropriate 
for someone to explain the loss of knowledge as due to a decrease in the payoff. 
But again, it would be odd for someone to say “I did know p, but the payoff 
decreased. I guess now I don’t know that p.” Though similar to the issue in the 
above paragraph, it presents a further problem for KJ because Fantl and McGrath 
take that principle to be in line with our standard knowledge-attributing/denying 
practices. So, the fact that KJ permits odd explanations of knowledge acquisition 
and loss creates a significant problem for their view.  
Interpreting these cases according to Worth It and intellectualism results in 
some common and plausible responses. For example, the subject might say, “I 
know the answer, but I’m not going to risk some mishap or mistake when I’d only 
get a jelly bean. It’s not even worth trying.” This sort of response is natural and 




and the natural-sounding responses of intellectualism, it is clear we should opt for 
the latter. 
So, it looks like WIT provides the better interpretation of JB-Know. Most 
importantly, if WIT is correct, then there is no threat to intellectualism because we 
also have a plausible way to explain why Jack’s response seems natural that avoids 
concluding his claim to know is false.  
§4.10 Conclusion 
 I have discussed Baron Reed’s counterexample to KJ and argued that it is a 
more effective attack on KJ than Fantl and McGrath have taken it to be. Not only 
is it a counterexample to KJ, it can also be modified to attack Safe Reasons which 
is the second premise of their principled argument. Since KJ is not supported by 
any principled argument, the debate between the practicalist and intellectualist 
comes down to the explanatory plausibility of the views.  
Together with WIT, intellectualism provides a cleaner explanation for why 
certain actions with higher risks are not practically rational. As I’ve argued, it is 
not about a lack of justification, but the simple fact that the payoff is not good 
enough in relation to the penalty. For an act to be practically rational, the payoff 
must be good enough. The examples discussed, 10K and Nickel, confirm this idea 
and, moreover, they lead to some odd problems for Fantl and McGrath’s view; 
namely, if KJ is true, then one can gain or lose knowledge merely from an 




avoidable if we hold to intellectualism. In sum, there doesn’t seem to be much 
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 The traditional view of knowledge includes two plausible claims. The first 
claim is that the truth-conditions required to know some proposition p do not 
vary. So, for any two subjects who have the same epistemic position regarding p, 
either both know that p or both do not know that p. An implication of this 
invariantist position is that any difference in knowledge will be explained by a 
difference in their epistemic position. The second claim is that only epistemic or 
‘truth-conducive’ reasons are relevant to considerations of knowledge. This 
intellectualist position has recently come under attack from those who argue that 
whether someone knows that p is partly restricted by their practical situation. 
 The first task of this dissertation is to defend invariantism from the 
contextualist view that the truth-conditions required to know that p are context-
dependent. Contextualists argue that their view best explains our ordinary and 
intuitively correct knowledge-attributing practices. In response, I argue that they 




intuitive. The debate largely hinges on identifying a mistake in the relevant cases 
and to that end I argue a closer analysis of contextualist cases reveals just such a 
mistake. In short, the ‘knowledge-denial’ rests on a false belief. 
 The second task is to defend intellectualism from the practicalist view of 
Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. Initially, I argue that the argument from their 
central KJ principle is susceptible to a counter-example first used by Baron Reed 
to attack the principle itself. This counter-example is much stronger than first 
realized as it also applies to the SafeReasons principle used as a premise in the 
argument for KJ. After showing the argument to be unsound, I discuss further 
examples which reveal a second condition on rational action. This condition 
suggests that knowing p is not sufficient to justify acting on p—as is implied by 
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